Though
it has been more than a year since the sub-prime crisis
in the US mortgage sector came to light, the meltdown
in global financial markets, especially its Wall Street
frontage, persists. Just days after the Treasury and
the Federal chose to nationalise Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac and pump in as much a $200 billion to keep them
solvent, troubled Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., the
fourth largest investment bank on Wall Street came
to the table with requests for support. This was to
be expected, not just because of the nationalisation
of the government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) in
the mortgage market, but because of the role that
the Federal Reserve and the Treasury had taken on
to inject liquidity into the market and support and
part finance the merger of Bear Stearns with J.P.
Morgan Chase. Even when the Treasury Secretary declared
that the government was unwilling to bail out Lehman,
and tried arm twisting the big banks to buy into the
company, the effort failed because it was not willing
to underwrite the process with tax payers’ money.
What followed is the beginning of a tale still being
told. The 158-year old Lehman filed for bankruptcy
and Merrill Lynch, one more Wall Street icon, chose
to pre-empt a similar fate befalling it by deciding
to sell out to Bank of America in a $50 billion all
stock deal. That may appear a good price relative
to its then prevalent market capitalisation of $26
billion, but was way below the $80 billion high it
had reached during the previous 52 weeks. Meanwhile,
the insurance and investment management major AIG
(American International Group) has been struck by
a major ratings downgrade and is in Fed mediated talks
to secure a $75 billion line of credit that would
help cover the additional collateral it would have
to provide it derivatives trading partners because
of that downgrade. If that line of credit does not
materialise (or perhaps even if it does) AIG too is
heading towards bankruptcy.
What accounts for the recent spate of problems? All
of them are related to the now-not-so-new sub-prime
crisis and the unwillingness of both the institutions
concerned and the regulators to properly assess the
effects of that crisis on their financial viability.
On the contrary, they have been strenuously engaged
in concealing those effects. Consider for example
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac which acquire mortgages
from banks, housing finance companies or other financial
institutions, so as to keep lending for housing acquisitions
going. According to reports, just before they were
placed under conservatorship, they together held or
backed $5.3 trillion in mortgages. What is more with
the mortgage markets facing a credit squeeze over
the last year, they were providing 70-80 per cent
of new mortgage loans. To undertake these activities,
these firms were indebted to a range of creditors,
credit from many of whom would freeze up if these
GSEs defaulted on their commitments. Any effort on
the part of these creditors to sell their debt would
result in a decline in value that would threaten the
financial viability of many of them.
Thus, there were two important reasons, among many,
why these institutions could not be allowed to close.
First, mortgage credit would dry up resulting in a
collapse of the already declining prices in the housing
market. Second, the fall out for the viability of
other financial firms and the stability of financial
markets could be dire. An implication was that institutions
such as these should exercise caution in their operations
and be subject to stringent supervision, neither of
which seems to have been the case. Managers who paid
themselves fat salaries and bonuses backed suspect
mortgage loans and bought into suspect mortgage-backed
securities on the presumption that defaults would
be low. And regulators not merely turned a blind eye
to such activities but missed the use of accounting
practices, which though not in violation of rules,
overestimated the capital resources and financial
strength of these firms. At the time of the nationalisation,
losses on mortgage related securities were estimated
at $34.3 billion in the case of Freddie and $11.2
billion in the case of Fannie, both of which were
kept out of calculations of regulatory capital by
treating them as temporary losses. On the other hand,
these losses were used to generate deferred tax assets
on their balance sheets on the assumption that they
would make large enough profits in future, so that
these losses can be offset against the tax to be paid
on those profits. The fact of the matter, however,
was that these firms were on the verge of insolvency,
and ended up needing huge taxpayer-financed, bail-out
packages to survive.
The Fannie and Freddie experience illustrated a larger
feature of the increasingly deregulated financial
markets across the globe: the tendency to exploit
easy liquidity conditions to leverage investments
in areas varying from housing and real estate to stock
and derivatives markets. According to Lehman Brothers’
bankruptcy filing, it owes more than $600 billion
to creditors worldwide. With much of that money being
invested in mortgage-backed securities, the collapse
in the value of those securities must have increased
demands for additional collateral that Lehman was
hard pressed to find. It contemplated sale of either
parts of its business or of equity, with the state-controlled
Korea Development Bank emerging a potential suitor.
When that did not work, the value of Lehman’s shares
collapsed, touching less than $10 a share as compared
to $80 in May-June 2007, making it even more difficult
for it to find additional funding. Lehman then sought
a solution in a “innovative” scheme of hiving off
its real estate assets originally valued at $30 billion
into a separate public company that would look for
a suitor. That would have helped save the parent.
But when that too failed to materialise bankruptcy
seemed a real possibility.
This forced the Treasury and the Fed to bring other
private financial institutions to the table, as it
did a few years earlier with Long Term Capital Management,
to work out a takeover or at least an acquisition
of the worst bit of the firm’s assets with some help
from the Fed. The offer of marginal support from the
Fed and the Treasury proved inadequate, because the
institutions concerned were unsure whether this could
stall the crisis creeping through other firms as well.
The Treasury on the other hand, had had enough of
using tax payers’ money to save firms that had erred
their way into trouble. The refusal of the state to
take over the responsibility of managing failing firms
sent a strong message. Not only was Lehman forced
to file for bankruptcy, but a giant like Merrill Lynch
that had also notched up large losses due to sub-prime
related exposures decided that it should sort matters
out before there were no suitors interested in salvaging
its position as well. In a surprise move, Bank of
America that was being spoken to as a potential buyer
of Lehman was persuaded to acquire Merrill Lynch instead,
bringing down two of the major independent investment
banks on Wall Street. With Bear Stearns already dead,
that leaves only Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs,
whose fortunes too are being dissected on Wall Street.
Whether they too would disappear into the vaults of
some large bank is an issue being debated.
This is, however, only part of the problem that Lehman
leaves behind. The other major issue is the impact
its bankruptcy would have on its creditors. Citigroup
and Bank of New York Mellon have an exposure to the
institution that is placed at upwards of a staggering
$155 billion. A clutch of Japanese banks, led by Aozora
Bank, are owed an amount in excess of a billion. There
are European banks that have significant exposure.
And all of these are already faced with strained balance
sheets. More trouble in financial markets seems inevitable.
This, therefore, is truly the end of an era. The
independent investment banks are under threat. The
state is no more seen as an agency that can buy its
way out of any crisis. And the crisis that has dragged
on for more than a year just refuses to go away. But
all this still seems inadequate to force a rethink
of the financial liberalisation that triggered these
problems.
September
15 , 2008.
|