While
the annual trade figures released by the World Trade
Organization for 2003 points to strengthening recovery
in global trade and an optimistic outlook on prospects
for further trade expansion,[1]
an analysis of medium-term developments in global
trade patterns suggests that even an expanding world
trade scenario may not be as promising or neutral
in its implications for the prospects for developing
countries' trade expansion.
The medium-term developments in global trade provided
in a report that forms part of a broader WTO annual
study titled "World Trade Report 2004", highlights
two significant areas in which international trade
patterns have experienced major structural changes
at the disaggregated product level over the past two
decades (1985-2003)[2].
Along with the fact that contrary to general perception,
growth in services trade no longer outstrips that
in goods, there is a shift in agricultural trade to
processed products, away from commodities.
It is argued in this review that these structural
shifts would have critical implications for the prospects
of developing and less developed countries to expand
their market shares in world trade. The first section
will give a brief overview of the global trade trends
in 2003, following which the structural shifts in
services and agricultural trade patterns are examined
for their implications.
Trade Trends in 2003
According to the annual trade figures released by
the World Trade Organization, despite being one of
the more disruptive years in recent times, 2003 proved
a good year for the world economy. A 2.5% increase
in global output, propelled mainly by higher than
expected economic growth in Asia and the United States,
spurred world trade to recover by an average real
increase of 4.5% in 2003. This was stronger than expected
a year ago after the outbreak of SARS and the US-led
war in Iraq in early 2003. In addition to the fact
that this strengthens the global trade recovery in
2002 from the sharp decline in the preceding year,
the projection is that 2004 also looks promising for
further trade expansion[3].These
annual estimates from the WTO offer an optimistic
outlook on world trade prospects.
Trade growth exceeded output growth by an atypically
small margin in 2003 when compared to the 1990s, when
average trade expansion was 6.5%, approximately twice
as fast as merchandise output growth. It is partly
because of the end of the information technology sector
boom which was the most dynamic segment in world trade
over the 1990s, that the typical excess of trade over
output growth was unusually small in 2002 and 2003.
However, as in 2002, trade acceleration in 2003 was
much stronger in dollar values than in real terms[4].
The nominal value of world merchandise exports rose
by as much as 16% to $7.3 trillion and commercial
services exports expanded by 12% to $1.8 trillion
in 2003. Both these were the strongest annual increase
in nominal terms since 1995.
This difference between the nominal and real trade
growth rates reflected the major role played by exchange
rate changes and commodity price rises in inflating
dollar trade values. For the first time since 1995,
dollar prices increased for both agricultural and
manufactured products in 2003. It is estimated that
on the global average, prices of manufactured goods
rose by nearly 10 per cent, the first annual increase
since 1995. Similarly, fuel prices were up by 16 per
cent, boosted by temporary supply shortfalls linked
to the conflict in the Middle East and civil unrest
in Venezuela, as well as due to increased oil demand
from the US and a booming Chinese economy. On average,
the prices of non-fuel commodities also rose by 7
per cent on spot markets, including a 12% increase
in metal prices.
The combined effect of these price rises and exchange
rate changes involving dollar depreciation against
major currencies led to a 10.5% strengthening of world
merchandise trade prices in 2003. Thus, the large
increase registered by merchandise trade in nominal
terms was a reflection of this.
Meanwhile, commercial services trade, which accounts
for about one-fifth of world trade in goods and services,
also expanded by 12% in 2003. Even though this was
the strongest increase since 1995, services grew less
rapidly than merchandise trade in 2003 in contrast
to the preceding two years (2001 and 2002).
The influence of price and exchange rate effects on
nominal merchandise trade differed sharply by region,
depending upon the sectoral distribution of exports
as well as the exchange rate regimes adopted by the
various economies. In general, nominal export growth
in excess of 20 per cent was recorded by many oil
exporting countries (e.g. Russia and Saudi Arabia)
and in countries with strongly appreciating currencies,
in particular in Western Europe. Two thirds of the
nominal rise in the Middle East's exports was accounted
for by higher oil prices. In Africa too, merchandise
exports of oil exporters (and South Africa) expanded
at a greater rate than the majority of non-oil exporting
countries. But, while the share of Africa in world
merchandise exports increased in 2003, at 2.3% it
remained below the level recorded ten years ago.
Exchange rate changes had the most significant influence
on trade values in the case of Western Europe. Despite
a near stagnation in volume terms, there was a 17%
increase in Western Europe's merchandise dollar export
value. This was almost entirely due to the price effects
of the strength of the euro and other European currencies
vis-à-vis the US dollar, as its trade in fact
reported a small decrease when measured in euro terms.
For the third year in a row, the transition economies
recorded the greatest merchandise output and trade
growth of all regions in 2003, facilitated by a combination
of strong currencies, higher fuel prices, strong regional
demand (including from Russia), and rising FDI inflows
due to their deepening westward integration.
The lowest export growth in dollar values was reported
for North America and Lain America. Interestingly,
after the stagnant growth in 2002, Latin America's
exports rose by 4.5%, sustained mainly by a recovery
in demand for primary products from Asia.
Asia is the only region where price changes accounted
for less than one-third of the increase in dollar
value of the region's merchandise exports. Significantly,
Asia's merchandise trade was driven strongly by the
expansion not only of China's trade, but also intra-Asian
trade. With its imports growing at 40% and exports
at 35% in nominal dollar terms, China's trade expansion
was unprecedented for a country with such substantial
trade volume. Its export and import expansion was
most outstanding particularly in office machinery
and telecom equipment segment.
Although more detailed data, especially on intra-Asian
trade, is required for making conclusive observations,
the above trend points towards the increased integration
of China into the electronics sector production networks,
regionally and internationally. The large flow of
capital goods to China highlighted by the report as
financed by strong FDI inflows related to the relocation
of manufacturing assembly operations and the recovery
in the electronics industry, does appear to support
this observation.
In fact, this in itself may explain the large expansion
in intra-Asian trade. For example, according to the
WTO, the higher than regional average trade growth
recorded by the Republic of Korea was owing to a sharp
rise in its exports to China linked to the recovery
of the IT sector. The accelerated growth in Asia's
largest economies driven by a recovery in the electronics
and IT sectors thus may have provided a major stimulus
to regional trade expansion. In addition, the 2.7%
GDP growth in Japan after years of recession also
contributed to the momentum in Asian trade.
Meanwhile, for the first time, China's imports exceeded
those of Japan, and China currently ranks number three
among the world's leading merchandise importers. The
increased and heavy dependence on Chinese economic
expansion that this implies for sustaining global
trade growth has serious implications for world economic
growth prospects.
Additionally, for the third successive year, United
States import growth exceeded the world average and
continued to be a significant factor in mitigating
sluggish world trade growth. Thus, the fact that US
import growth continues to exceed export growth, widening
its trade deficit further, also continues to be a
factor causing uncertainty about the sustainability
of world trade growth.
While all regions recorded stronger nominal export
and import growth in 2003 compared to 2002 in the
case of merchandise trade, in services trade, Asia's
exports are estimated to have expanded at a lower
rate than in 2002. While Asia and Latin America's
export expansion was limited to 6 per cent, Western
Europe and the transition economies recorded annual
gains ranging from 16 per cent to 21 per cent boosted
by the strength of their currencies vis-à-vis
the dollar. Thus, gains in the ranking of the leading
commercial services traders in 2003 were recorded
principally by West European countries and transition
economies at the expense of American and Asian countries.
Clearly, the annual data for 2003 was impacted by
temporary and cyclical factors which tend to affect
a single year's data. Thus, shifting the focus towards
medium-term structural changes at the disaggregated
product level, we can better decipher the underlying
structural pattern influencing these trends.
Structural Shifts in Global
Trade: Medium-term Trends in Manufacturing and Services
Trade
A summary of world trade developments by six broad
sectors for the period 1985-2002 as provided in the
WTO report of June is reproduced in the Chart below.
As this report points out, while at the aggregate
level services and merchandise trade growth have evolved
in a roughly similar way since 1990, developments
are more varied at a disaggregated level.
It reveals that since 1985, transport services as
well as agricultural and mining products among merchandise
product groups expanded less rapidly than world trade.
Thus, while the share of the travel category rose
between 1985 and 1995, it decreased thereafter. In
contrast, trade in manufactured goods and the "other"
services category was more dynamic, showing steadily
increasing shares over the period. Among all product
and services categories, the share of mining products
shows the biggest variations owing to the impact of
fluctuating oil prices throughout the 1985-2002 period.
Thus, overall, there is no indication that services
categories in general have increased their share in
international trade and the latter continues to be
dominated by manufactured products to the extent of
75%. This implies that manufacturing sector capabilities
will strongly dominate the prospects of developing
and less developed countries' ability to increase
their shares in global trade.
A further breakdown of the fast growing world exports
of manufactured goods however reveals that the most
dynamic product subcategory by far has been office
and telecom equipment, which expanded at twice the
rate observed for total manufactured goods in the
1990s. Consequently, its share gained five percentage
points between 1990 and 2000 and accounted for 12.1
per cent of world merchandise and services exports.
In fact, the gains of this group exceeded the gains
made by all manufactured goods combined. Even though
the crisis in the IT sector in 2000 arrested this
trend and the share of the sector in total manufactures
has stagnated since then, it continues to be one of
the three largest manufactured export segments, along
with other machinery and equipment as well as chemicals.
Among the other subcategories of manufactured goods,
iron and steel products and textiles products recorded
below average trade growth in the 1990s, and showed
a significant decline in their share in world trade
over the 1990-2002 period.
These trends clearly point towards rising concentration
of global trade not only in manufactured products,
but within manufacturing into an increasingly narrow
range of products such as machinery and equipment
and chemicals.
Chart: Share of major goods
and services categories in world exports (a),
1985-2002.
(Percentage)
|
a
Goods and commercial services exports combined.
|
Source:
WTO, International Trade Statistics, 2003. |
However, import liberalisation that has been occurring
in the manufactured sector through tariff reduction
under the non-agricultural market access (NAMA) negotiations,
and restrictions on industrial policy options brought
in through trade-related investment measures (TRIMs)
have been rapidly eroding the South's capability to
establish indigenously founded export-oriented manufacturing
sectors, which can withstand shifts in competitive
advantages. Further, the pattern of global foreign
direct investment (FDI) shows that machinery &
equipment and chemicals industries have also been
the largest FDI recipients throughout the 1990s. This
means that most of the benefits of the dynamism in
world trade in manufactures will be appropriated by
the MNC firms involved in the world-wide manufacturing
sector production networks.
The trends provided by the report regarding services
trade also suggest gloomy prospects for the South,
despite alluring promises being made in services trade
negotiations under the GATS, regarding the opportunities
for developing countries to expand their export revenues
through services exports.
In 2003, commercial service exports as a whole was
dominated by the US, UK, Germany, France, Japan and
other West European countries. In fact, Western Europe
alone constitutes about one half of world commercial
services exports. Among the select few developing
countries which had a presence among the top 30 leading
commercial services exporters' list last year, only
China and Hong Kong accounted for shares of 2.5% each
in the total. The others such as South Korea, Singapore,
India, Greece, Taiwan Province of China, Turkey, Russia, Thailand, Malaysia
and Mexico all had shares ranging only between 2%
to 0.7%.
At the same time, a larger number of developing countries
were present among the top 30 leading importers of
services in 2003. Even for China, which has emerged
as the largest services exporter among developing
countries, imports of commercial services continued
to exceed its exports in 2003. Only Hong Kong recorded
a significant net surplus in services trade, while
Singapore and India also recorded some minor surplus
in 2003. In general, net gains from trade in services
appear to be in the deficit for the large majority
of even leading developing country service exporters.
The reason behind this may be found in the medium-term
trends in commercial services trade.
Even though detailed statistics on commercial services
trade are not yet systematically available, on the
basis of a sample of large services traders, the report
indicates a few sub-categories of international services
trade which report outstandingly strong export growth
between 1995 and 2002. These subcategories comprise
(in descending order of their estimated growth rate)
computer and information services, financial services,
insurance, personal, cultural, and recreational services;
and royalties and licence fees[5].
It can be seen that almost all of these, especially
the fastest growing IT and financial services, are
dominated by developed country firms. It is evident
that the level of sophistication required to compete
in the markets for these services will not be within
the reach of the majority of middle and low-income
countries.
Thus, if the developing countries succumb to the pressure
in the ongoing GATS negotiations, to change the ownership
and delivery of services in their countries through
its massive deregulation and privatization agenda
covering the entire scope of services, it will only
help the developed country transnational corporations
to secure an expansion in their already dominant global
market share for services.
Medium-term Developments in
Aggregate Agricultural Trade
Even more disturbing long-term trends emerge from
the WTO report in the case of global agricultural
trade. First of all, even as agricultural trade remains
very important for many countries, the share of agricultural
trade in world trade has decreased steadily in the
longer term. Secondly, processed agricultural products
have been a more dynamic component of international
agricultural trade in the 1990s than unprocessed and
semi-processed goods.
There are several inter-related aspects of agricultural
trade which are brought out in the report. Most significantly,
the significance of trade in the agricultural sector
has increased tremendously across the globe. The volume
growth of world agricultural trade during 1990-2002
was close to 4 per cent annually, which was roughly
twice that of agricultural production. Real trade
growth in agriculture during 1990-2002 in fact exceeded
that over the 1973-1990 period (2.4 per cent). It
is clear that this points to the increasing role of
trade in agricultural sector at the global level.
However, despite this faster growth when compared
to the earlier period, since growth in agricultural
trade was less strong than total merchandise trade
in nominal terms between 1990 and 2002, its share
in total merchandise trade has decreased from 29 per
cent in 1963 to as low as 9.3 per cent in 2002
[6]. The steadily declining
share of agricultural products in merchandise exports
in the 1990s could be observed in most regions. The
share of agricultural products in intra-developing
country trade also decreased from 15.5 per cent in
1990 to 10.7 per cent in 2002. Thus, even as the importance
of trade in the agricultural sector has increased
and agricultural trade remains very important for
many countries, the share of agricultural trade in
world trade has decreased steadily in the longer term.
While the report does not offer any explanation for
these seemingly conflicting trends, clearly, the erosion
of agriculture products' share in total merchandise
trade when agricultural trade was expanding in real
terms reflects the steady terms-of-trade decline experienced
by agricultural commodities over the last several
decades[7]. The impact
of this has been the most severe for those countries
which are dominant suppliers of these products globally.
But, even so, agricultural products remain, for many
countries, the mainstay of their merchandise exports.
In recent years (1999-2001), agricultural exports
accounted for more than one quarter of total merchandise
exports in more than 55 countries (developed and developing)
and still exceeded one half of total merchandise exports
for 32 countries.
There were no significant changes in the regional
shares of global agricultural trade during 1990-2002.
While Western Europe's and North America's share in
world exports of agricultural products each recorded
a decline of two to three percentage points, the combined
share of Australia and New Zealand at 4.5 per cent
in 2002, remained unchanged compared to 1990. For
the developing countries as a group, the share amounted
to 30 per cent in 2002 compared to 27 per cent in
1990. However, this increase in the share of developing
countries was mainly restricted to the Latin American
and transition economies, which increased their share
by about two percentage points between 1990 and 2002.
Developing Asia recorded only marginal gains over
the entire period, whereas the share of Africa declined
slightly. Also, the increase seen in the share of
developing countries could be just due to the impact
of the recovery in agricultural commodity prices in
2003 from the decline since 1995, which may have led
to slight improvements in the shares of some of the
agricultural exporting developing and low income countries.
But, this could not be ascertained from the information
available in the current report. Accounting for about
70%, developed countries dominated global agricultural
trade in 2002.
However, the report does point out that the share
of intra-developing country trade in developing country
agricultural exports has increased significantly from
31 per cent in 1990 to as much as 43 per cent in 2002.
At the same time, interestingly, the share of intra-developing
country trade in developing country imports of agricultural
products was even larger than that in the case of
exports. In 2002, nearly one half (47.6%) of developing
country agricultural imports originated from other
developing countries.
These trends inevitably lead us to conclude that for
developing country agricultural exports, the developed
country markets have clearly become less accessible
than those in developing countries, despite the fact
that WTO negotiations have been bringing about tariff
liberalisation in agricultural trade. But, simultaneously,
the fact that there has been a steady rise in the
commercialisation of agricultural production globally,
dominated by transnational agribusiness firms, could
also be behind this rapid rise in intra-developing
country agricultural trade.
It has been observed that the concentration in the
international food processing and food manufacturing
industries has increased tremendously over time and
that these industries have moved from being more or
less competitive, to being oligopolistic or monopolistic
in nature. Companies which were engaged in one stage
of the food system have either diversified into other
stages of the food system or have forged strategic
allegiances through mergers, partnerships and acquisitions.
For instance, companies such as Cargill, Monsanto
in foodgrains and Tyson Foods in livestock not only
grow crops and rear livestock, but also process and
manufacture food products which they finally sell
to the retailers. By integrating all the stages of
the food system, such companies have come to own the
products from the farm to the shelf
[8].These changes in the way agricultural
production and trade are organised around the world
could also be the underlying factor behind the other
major structural change in agricultural trade highlighted
by the WTO report.
Structural Shifts in Global
Agricultural Trade
When agricultural trade between 1990 and 2002 was
analysed by their stage of processing (or value-added
content), it was found that exports of processed agricultural
products expanded significantly faster than those
of semi-processed and unprocessed agricultural products.
The share of processed products showed a clear upward
trend throughout the 1990s, rising from 42 per cent
in 1990-91 to 48 per cent of global agricultural trade
in 2001-02.
The data revealed that trade in beverages (which are
considered 100 per cent processed) recorded an above
average expansion in the 1990-2002 period (4.8 per
cent annually), while natural fibres and hides and
skins (which are considered 100 per cent unprocessed)
recorded an absolute decrease or near stagnation in
the observed period. In eight other categories (with
the potential to move from unprocessed and semi-processed
to processed goods), there was a marked shift to more
processed goods within the group (cereals and products,
coffee, tea, cocoa and spices, fish, other foodstuff,
meat and live animals, other agricultural goods (including
cut flowers), tobacco and sugar and sugar products.
A moderate decrease or stable share of processed goods
was observed for the remaining categories (dairy products,
eggs, fruits, vegetables and nuts and oilseeds, cakes
and vegetable oil).
The report reveals that about three quarters of the
countries for which data was available in the UN Comtrade
database recorded an increase in the share of processed
goods in their agricultural trade between 1990-91
and 2001-02. In fact, there was a marked increase
in the share of processed products in total agricultural
exports for the 14 major global exporters, with the
exception of two Latin American countries (Brazil
and Chile). The largest shifts to more processed agricultural
products could be observed in Asian developing countries
(China, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, with gains
in shares of processed over unprocessed agricultural
exports of 14, 17, 28 and 11 percentage points respectively).
Marked increases could also be observed for Canada
and Mexico. Agricultural exports of developing countries
to high-income markets also experienced this structural
change.
Based on this, the report summarises that there has
been a broad-based shift across countries towards
processed agricultural products, which have been a
more dynamic component of international agricultural
trade in the 1990s than unprocessed and semi-processed
goods. The conclusion appears to be that most countries
have and would benefit from this structural shift.
However, the real picture may be more complicated
than what the report appears to suggest.
Based on trends in two lower income countries, Bolivia
and Peru, which have a higher share of processed goods
in their agricultural exports than New Zealand, the
report suggests that there is no strong overall link
in the sample between income levels and the share
of processed agricultural products. But, it then contradicts
this by adding that in general all countries with
a very low share of processed goods in their agricultural
exports (15 per cent or less) are indeed low or low
middle-income countries (e.g. Cameroon, Ethiopia,
Honduras, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Uganda and Zimbabwe).
On the contrary, one of the major implications of
the fact that processed goods have become the more
dynamic category of agricultural trade would be its
impact on the trade expansion capacity of developing
and low income agricultural commodity exporting countries.
Based on the singular example of Chile which managed
to expand agricultural trade between 1990-2001 across
all product categories and stages of processing, the
WTO report claims that the above structural shift
does not imply that individual countries cannot achieve
high export growth in unprocessed and semi-processed
goods. Chile's outstanding export expansion in agricultural
products would clearly need a deeper investigation
to understand in particular whether it was related
to any free trade agreements in operation.
But, as the report itself points out in the concluding
paragraph, with respect to agricultural exports of
low-income countries, no shift towards an increased
share of processed goods could be observed in any
of the three major higher income markets. Thus, there
seems to be an attempt to underplay the possible unfavourable
outcomes that this structural shift in agricultural
trade may bring about.
According to the WTO report, the two factors that
favour the expansion of processed goods over unprocessed
goods are the following. First, processed goods have
a larger potential for intra-industry trade and offer
more possibilities for product differentiation than
unprocessed goods. The example offered is that cocoa-producing
countries will not see much bilateral trade in cocoa
beans, for example, while chocolate-bar/snack producing
countries can exchange their products, satisfying
a broad variety of different tastes. As per capita
income levels increase, consumers appreciate a larger
variety of similar products and increasingly buy goods
with a brand label.
Secondly, the potential to increase value added for
a given consumer food product is, in general, far
larger than for unprocessed foods and this underlies
the shift to increased trade in processed foods. Also,
the trend to smaller household size and an increase
in participation by women in the labour force strengthens
consumption trends towards more processed food at
the expense of unprocessed food. In fact, this is
confirmed by the trend on the import side, which showed
an even more striking increase towards a higher share
of processed goods. Among the 38 major agricultural
importers, only eight recorded a decrease in the share
of processed goods [9].
It is evident that with processed goods becoming the
more dynamic segment within agricultural trade globally,
for the middle and low income agricultural exporters
to expand their export revenues from agricultural
trade, they would have to first of all participate
in this dynamism. However, the value addition and
product differentiation required for being successful
exporters in the processed segment calls for production
process capabilities, which the report appears to
take for granted, but which are largely beyond the
reach of the indigenous farming communities in such
countries. This implies that manufacturing sector
capabilities will strongly dominate the prospects
of developing and less developed countries' ability
to increase their shares in global agricultural trade.
Ironically, the logic offered for advocating tariff
escalation to developing countries is that progressively
higher tariffs on higher stages of processing than
for agricultural commodities will promote their shift
to higher value added agricultural products. However,
by being forced to undertake rapid tariff liberalisation
of their lower-end primary products, these countries'
very base for generating the surplus revenues required
for investment in higher value-added processing segments
is getting eroded. Many low income countries are being
pushed into cutting their agricultural input subsidies,
promote commercial export-oriented agricultural production,
and reduce their agricultural tariffs all at the same
time, as conditions for multilateral loans. These
policy prescriptions, for instance, find their place
in the so-called country papers, or the Poverty Reduction
Strategy Papers (PRSPs).
That is, while developed country agricultural exporters
enjoy high subsidies, their developing country partners
are being forced to reduce subsidies. Further, even
as the tariff reduction imposed upon the developing
and less developed countries exposes their farmers
to competition from the highly subsidized farm production
in the developed world, actual market access provided
by developed countries for developing country agricultural
exports remain immensely low, because of the high
tariffs and quotas and the prevalence of domestic
support and export subsidies given by the EU and the
US. Thus, the ability of low and middle-income agricultural
producers to upgrade themselves to break into the
global markets dominated by the increasingly integrated
production and trading networks of transnational agribusiness
firms on their own is highly limited.
Therefore, proliferation of agricultural trade which
pushes commercialised agricultural production on the
one hand and refuse meaningful market access on the
other hand is happening at one level. Thus, most of
the benefits of the dynamism in trade in processed
agricultural products will be appropriated by the
MNC firms involved in the global agri-food value chain.
At another level, there is increasing food import
dependence because of agricultural trade liberalisation
by developing countries. These simultaneous processes
will lead to the break-down of the self-sustaining
agricultural production systems that have been the
traditional backbone of middle and low income countries'
farming communities.
This will have severe human development implications,
food security being central to them. The fact that
the rise in commercialisation of agricultural activities
is corresponding with a period of increasing global
poverty levels and decreasing per capita food consumption
in several countries, as has been highlighted by many
agricultural economists, in fact portends the impending
development crisis facing the South.
September 6, 2004.
[1]See the press
release "World Trade 2003, Prospects For 2004",
April 2004, available at <http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres04_e/pr373_e.htm>
[2] See, "Recent Trends in International
Trade and Policy Developments" released on 11
June available at <http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres04_e/pr378_e.htm>
[3] See the press release "World Trade
2003, Prospects For 2004", April 2004, available at
<http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres04_e/pr373_e.htm>
[4] The real or volume increase is
the value of nominal trade adjusted for price and
exchange rate changes. It is not a measure for the
physical quantity of goods traded internationally.
Source: WTO, 2004, opcit.
[5] According
to the report, a major uncertainty associated with
these estimates derives from the fact that detailed
services statistics by sub-category are not available
for US intra-affiliate trade.
[6] However, a small recovery of the
share of agricultural exports could be observed between
2000 and 2002 as the value of agricultural trade expanded
by 5.5 per cent while that of world merchandise trade
stagnated over that period.
[7] Dollar prices for agricultural
products fell until 1995 and rose in 2003 for the
first time since 1995.
[8] See for instance, the discussion
in Jayati Ghosh, 2003, "Corporate Agriculture: The
Implications for Indian Farmers" available at
http://www.macroscan.com/fet/dec03/pdf/Corp_Agri.pdf.
[9] One notable exception to this
general trend is China with its huge increase in
imports of primary agricultural products.
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