On
25 August in 2002, Uruguay's 177th year of independence,
70,000 people protested on the streets of Montevideo.
The protestors raised slogans against unemployment,
the continuing agricultural recession and the financial
crisis. Their ultimate protest was against government
policies that blindly pursue IMF conditions, and which
have resulted in complete dependence on the IMF and
an inability to break away from the stranglehold of
the US. Strikes and protest marches, fuelled by the
economic decline and banking difficulties, have become
an increasingly common sight in Montevideo.
Following in the footsteps of its Latin neighbours
Argentina and Brazil, Uruguay has been having its
share of major economic events that reflect the present
state of confusion and panic in the economy, if at
a smaller scale.
The continuous outflow of foreign reserves in the
wake of a peaking demand for the dollar forced Uruguay
to completely float its currency on 20th June, in
discontinuance of a floating exchange rate within
a 12 per cent band system tied to the dollar. The
Uruguayan Central Bank announced that, unlike in the
past when major interventions had kept the inflation
rate down, there would now be only limited intervention
to prop up the currency. This was also apparently
aimed at pleasing the IMF, which generally favours
floating of currencies, especially in situations of
a possible external debt default.
This was followed by the declaration of a four-day
bank holiday amidst fears of a bank run caused by
continuous withdrawals. Further, at the insistence
of the IMF and the US Treasury, a legislation (the
law for the Fund for the Stabilization of the Banking
System [FSBS]) limiting bank withdrawals was passed
by the Uruguayan Congress on 4th August. The legislation
introduced a measure preventing depositors at Uruguay's
two public banks from getting access to $2.2 billion
(which is three-quarters of the total) in long-term
dollar deposits until 2005.
These measures seemed to achieve their purpose. The
bank holiday was followed by a reversal of the previous
US position denying any further loans to Uruguay.
The IMF granted an additional 1.16 billion SDR (US$1.5
billion) in short-term loans (with a 24-month stand-by
credit) on 25 Jul, and another SDR 376 million (about
US$494 million) was given in the first week of August.
The new IMF commitment to Uruguay under stand-by terms
amounts to a total of SDR 2.13 billion, or about US$2.8
billion (IMF news brief no. 02/87, 8 August 2002).
The measures undertaken by the Uruguayan authorities,
together with the sanction of the loans, stabilized
the banking system somewhat, and no bank run seemed
evident on 4 August, when the bank holiday ended.
The banking legislation, however, proved to be less
than popular with the Inter-Union Workers Plenary–National
Workers Convention (PIT-CNT), which held a 14-hour
general strike on 7 August in which large numbers
participated. Previous strikes too, for example, the
24-hour general strike of 12 June, had drawn an increasingly
large number of people. The tenor of these strikes
has been similar: a demand for higher employment,
higher wages and a reversal of the government's efforts
to comply with IMF conditions by attempting a cut
in fiscal expenditure in the form of higher taxes
and increasing the rates of essential services. The
government's attempt to endear itself to the IMF is
obviously hitting the people on the streets a bit
too hard.
Compliance with the IMF directives has not however
protected Uruguay's economy much. The country's economic
turmoil has been multifaceted and long-lasting, although
panic has been the major cause of its undoing in recent
times.
The cornerstone of the Uruguayan economy, its agriculture
sector, has been hit by a long-drawn recession. A
drought in the second half of 1999 compounded by an
outbreak of the foot-and-mouth disease in April 2001,
devastated the agricultural economy. There was also
a fall in demand from neighbouring countries. The
problem in agriculture has spilled over to the rest
of the economy, since Uruguay's industry is mainly
agro-based. The industrial sector, which produces
17 per cent of the GDP, is largely based on the transformation
of agricultural products. Leading industrial sectors
include meat processing, agri-business, leather production,
textiles, and leather footwear, handbags and apparel.
Exports, too, take place mainly in agricultural products,
which make up more than half of the total exports.
Stock-raising is the mainstay of agricultural activity
that contributes 35 per cent of total exports in the
form of meat, wool and hides. The unfortunate timing
of the foot-and-mouth disease has therefore taken
a heavy toll on especially this sector of the Uruguayan
economy.
Exports, which are a major source of Uruguay's revenues,
have also been badly affected by the deterioration
in Brazil's economy, which takes 25 per cent of Uruguay's
exports. Demand from Brazil fell because of: (a) an
energy crisis and (b) a devaluation of its currency
that made exports more expensive. The economic conditions
in Argentina, another major trading partner, have
further reduced Uruguay's export demand. And markets
in America have not yet opened up fully. This has
added to the country's economic woes before it could
recover from its agricultural slump.
In the light of the above, it is not surprising that
Uruguay is going through its fourth consecutive year
of the general economic recession that began in 1999.
Apart from the recession in Brazil and the economic
collapse of Argentina, the fall in international commodity
prices have also had a severe impact. The steep increase
in international petroleum prices have hit Uruguay
hard as it is completely dependent on oil imports.
Foreign direct investment, exports, imports and GDP
growth have all been falling rapidly, while inflation
has been rising. Year-on-year GDP fell by 10.1 per
cent in the first quarter of 2002. GDP was primarily
affected by a 20 per cent fall in tourism, an 18 per
cent decline in manufacturing and a 14 per cent drop
in construction. Further deterioration seems inevitable
if the present policies continue -- the government
has predicted an 11 per cent decline in economic growth
this year and a further 4.5 per cent fall in 2003,
while inflation could reach an annual rate of 50 per
cent in twelve months' time.
Uruguay's IMF-led economic policies have been hopelessly
misdirected. Despite widespread protests, the Parliament
approved a ‘fiscal stability' law in May this
year, that increased taxes on wages and pensions and
allowed the government to raise tax rates on various
public services, including drinking water, electricity
and telecommunications. The law is intended to bring
the fiscal deficit within the limits the IMF has set
as a condition for loans. The government's economic
team, headed previously by Alberto Bensión
and now by Alejandro Atchugarry, is trying to reduce
the fiscal deficit. Simultaneously, limited interventions
by the Central Bank from now on will raise real interest
rates and tighten liquidity. This will obviously only
deepen the recession that has already been in effect
for several years. In the face of all these costs
it is an irony that further loans granted by the IMF
are likely to be short-term, and will have very little
impact on the economy.
Foreign direct investment has not picked up despite
concessions and privatization moves by the Battle
government. These include privatization of the national
airline, civil service restructuring, social security
reform, concessions to the national gas company, port
concessions, road maintenance concessions, and improvements
in financial sector regulation with Bank support.
But all these measures have not brought about the
economic stability they promised. They have, of course,
opened up the path for future economic control by
big powers like the US. More than a hundred US-owned
companies operate in Uruguay, and many more market
US goods and services.
The recent lower ratings by credit rating agencies
have not helped either, since they have made it more
difficult for the government to sell its bonds to
raise resources.
In addition to the above, the recent banking difficulties
have worsened the situation. Fear of a bank run was
caused by the banking collapse in neighbouring Argentina.
At the beginning of July 2002 the Central Bank reserves
had fallen by 5.5 per cent, bringing the fall to 55
per cent so far in the year 2002. Reserves, which
currently amount to US$1.39 billion, have been hit
by a 29 per cent fall in bank deposits in the first
five months of this year. A major share of Uruguay's
bank deposits are held by Argentineans, whose accounts
at home are frozen. So the pressure on capital flight
is even stronger as domestic and foreign deposits
are being simultaneously withdrawn.
Unlike Brazil, both Argentina and Uruguay also have
bank deposits in dollars or tied to the dollar. In
Uruguay, 85 per cent of the bank deposits are in dollars
or indexed to the dollar. So the run on the banks
has been fast draining the country's foreign reserves.
Uruguay faces the risk of running out of cash to make
debt payments. Fear of this brought on the bank holiday
and the freeze on withdrawal of long-term deposits.
The latter measure was implemented at the insistence
of the IMF and the US Treasury, thereby putting out
of reach of ordinary Uruguayans, access to their own
long-term deposits for three years. A restructuring
plan of the Uruguayan Central Bank also includes measures
such as liquidation of insolvent private banks like
Banco Montevideo/Caja Obrera, Banco Comercial and
Banco Credito, and transformation of the mortgage
bank (BHU) into a non-bank housing institution.
The banking sector in Uruguay has for long been open
to directives from the IMF. Though foreign investment
in this sector requires government authorization,
the fact that a lot of foreign, mainly US, banks operate
in Uruguay shows that this is not very restrictive.
Among the private banks operating in the country,
the majority are Uruguayan corporations that are mostly
owned by foreign banks, and the rest are branches
of foreign banks. Under Uruguayan banking legislation,
banks operating in Uruguay are considered national
banks even if their capital is held by a foreign bank.
Foreign banks may set up branches in Uruguay that
enjoy the same operating privileges as banks incorporated
in Uruguay. Financial houses, the majority of which
are owned by foreign banks, may conduct any type of
financial operations except those reserved exclusively
for banks, such as accepting deposits from Uruguayan
residents. In 2000, US direct investment in the banking
sector stood at US$257 million. This is likely to
have been another reason for the IMF's eagerness to
offer help to Uruguay.
Uruguay: What does the Future
Hold?
Even though the IMF loan has come through, it will
not solve Uruguay’s problems unless investor
panic can be controlled. This panic seems to be suspiciously
encouraged by the apparently loose statements made
by people like Paul O’Neill, the US Treasury
Secretary, after which an IMF loan becomes all the
more necessary. The IMF loan, which will increase
indebtedness, will have to be paid back soon, and
Uruguay is thus playing into the hands of the US.
Such debts cannot be repaid nor can they help the
economy, unless real sector changes are operative.
The government would do better to concentrate on developing
its sagging agricultural sector, hydropower potential
and gas pipelines.
On the other hand, desperate attempts have been made
by the present President to cut the fiscal deficit,
in compliance with IMF conditions,. This has moved
government resources away from key sectors like electricity
and water, increased unemployment and penalized wage-earners
by levying taxes on them, thus inducing greater panic
and misery among the people. In such a situation,
it is not surprising that they will seek to secure
whatever little savings they have in banks. But given
the new legislation and the threat of more bank holidays,
their access to their own deposits will also be severely
limited from now on.
Further, Uruguay has definitely not been helped by
factors like the recently announced increase in agricultural
subsidies to farmers in the US by the Bush Administration.
In fact, the continuance and increase of agricultural
subsidies in countries like the US and the EU run
contrary to the agreements of the WTO, and double
cross the signatory developing countries. In the words
of Benjamin Lessing, “With friends like that,
who needs enemies? Or, to put a finer point on it,
what good is an IMF bail-out if your economic future
is to sell agricultural products to the United States
on ridiculously poor terms of trade?” (‘The
Last Domino’, The American Prospect, 9 August
2002).
Even as following IMF policies has proved to be disastrous
for many countries, it becomes more so in an atmosphere
of economic domination and collusion within and among
developed countries like the US, Canada and the EU.
The IMF has been brokering individual country deals
in Latin America, mainly to prevent a strong coalition
within it, and to further strengthen US control over
individual markets by ensuring unimpeded access. The
proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) that
will combine all the American markets, is one such
attempt. The idea is to weaken the Mercosur trading
bloc, previously the third most powerful in the world,
which partially integrated markets in Brazil, Argentina,
Uruguay and Paraguay. Recent sessions of Mercosur
have recognized the need for resisting such moves
and forming coalitions and support systems within
it. The US offer of individual loans to Brazil and
Uruguay is a counter-move to pre-empt such an attempt.
By making these countries indebted and dependent on
the US, the latter hopes to break any possible threat
to its own interests from a Latin American coalition.
It is trying to make allies of some and enemies of
others, thus ensuring a conflict of interests among
the Latin American countries.
Regional coalitions, based on local interests, that
can challenge such domination is the only way Uruguay
can hope to maintain its economic freedom and profitability.
It should strengthen its ties with Mercosur and other
Latin American economies. Such need has been recognized
by many of its neighbours, often at a bitter cost,
but unfortunately the Uruguayan government still seems
far from this realization. It has been more pro-North
than many of its neighbours. President Batlle’s
administration has shown remarkable alacrity in forging
both a bilateral trade agreement and a Four-plus-One
free trade agreement between Mercosur and the US.
He has also severed diplomatic ties with Cuba, much
to the chagrin of many Uruguayans. His aim is obviously
to secure his own future and that of the economy,
which he hopes to do by securing loans. And the US
has tried to cash in on that. But as is evident from
the effects of the IMF policies -- higher inflation
and lower wages, to name just two -- Battle’s
well-being is not synonymous with that of the people
on the streets.
Opening up and privatization may be the operative
words in the Washington Consensus era, but indiscriminate
and complete opening up or privatization is not a
must for Uruguay. Uruguay is, in fact, the fourth
most free economy in Latin America, as adjudged by
the 2002 version of the ‘Index of Economic Freedom‘
by the Heritage Foundation. But that has not helped
it much. It needs to explore more cautious and wiser
policies for the few areas of the economy that are
not yet open, for example, transmission and distribution
rights in energy and oil imports. Uruguay would do
well to learn from Argentina, which immediately precedes
Uruguay in the ‘Index of Economic Freedom’
list.
The fact that opening up is not a necessary option
in today’s world is highlighted by the recent
attempts to sell off energy utilities by private multinationals
in Brazil, the delay of privatization of two oil companies
in India, and the consideration of re-nationalization
of private sector units in England. As highlighted
in Brazil, private sector interests, especially foreign,
in continuing investments in a country will be determined
by the state of that economy and its own state of
affairs elsewhere. This makes them very prone to sell
at any given point of time. Given the fact that Uruguay
at the moment does not fulfil the first requirement
and since many multinationals (led by Enron) are facing
trouble at home, the Uruguayan government may do well
to start looking inward rather than outward, especially
where the essential sectors of the economy are concerned.
Similarly, keeping the US happy may bring in loans
now but will take away the economic autonomy that
Uruguay will need sooner or later. The Uruguayan economy
has been traditionally strong. Its advantage in livestock
production has ensured substantial export revenues
in previous years. It is relatively free from corruption
and has a strong social security base. What it needs
to do is to develop its own industry, agriculture
and energy sector. There is no reason why it cannot
go back to standing on its own legs. It can also become
a strong ally of its neighbours, rather than of the
US.
Uruguay: Economic forecast summary
|
2001 |
2002
|
2003 |
Real GDP (%
change) |
-3.1 |
-6.3 |
3.0 |
Consumer prices
(% change; av) |
4.4 |
8.2 |
9.6 |
Exchange rate
Ps:US$ (av) |
13.319 |
18.042 |
24.786 |
Current account
(US$ m) Goods: exports fob |
2,110 |
1,987 |
2,256 |
Goods: imports
fob |
-2,914 |
-2,284 |
-2,642 |
Trade balance |
-804 |
-297 |
-386 |
Current-account
balance |
-511 |
-303 |
-345 |
Current-account
balance
(% of GDP) |
-2.8 |
-2.2 |
-3.1 |
External financing
(US$ m) Financing balance |
-1,071 |
-992 |
-1,482 |
Total debt |
8,669 |
11,670 |
11,574 |
Total debt service |
1,067 |
1,172 |
1,875 |
Debt-service
ratio, paid (%) |
28.0 |
36.7 |
48.3 |
Debt-service
ratio, due (%) |
28.0 |
36.7 |
48.3 |
SOURCE: Country Risk Service, Economist Intelligence
Unit |
|