When
the 19 heads of state and a representative of the
European Union met in Pittsburgh in September and
declared that from now on it would be the G20 and
not the G8 that would be responsible for managing
global capitalism they were merely recognising the
unavoidable. If global economic cooperation was to
be effective at all in the changed circumstances of
the last two or more decades, the presence at the
table of countries like Brazil, China, India and South
Africa was imperative. The need for such cooperation
was driven home by developments since the Asian financial
crisis of 1997-98, when it became clear that leaving
markets unregulated and market players alone in a
more economically integrated world would only precipitate
crises of global proportions. Not surprisingly the
G20 was born in 1999, even though the G8 nations and
the IMF they controlled were principally responsible
for designing the response to the 1997 crisis to the
detriment of growth, stability and welfare in the
developing world.
The crisis that erupted a decade later in 2007 was
different in at least two senses. First, it originated
and affected more adversely the US, UK and the EU.
And, second, underlying this crisis are global imbalances
that partly resulted from the effort of the developing
countries to insure themselves against a 1997-type
affliction or a post-1997-type correction. Those imbalances,
reflected in the use of foreign exchange surpluses
accumulating with developing countries to finance
deficits in the US, made it impossible for the G8
countries to resolve the crisis by themselves.
Once nations outside the G8 had to be brought into
the collegiums managing global capitalism, the choice
of the G20 as a forum recommended itself. Besides
the fact that it already existed and did not require
any new selection of members, there were three features
of the grouping that made it the forum of choice to
manage the new situation even from the point of view
of the US, UK and the EU. The first was that putting
the G20 at the centre of the global economic architecture
did not constitute a radical restructuring of that
edifice, but merely an expansion of the G8, even though,
as widely recognised, countries like Canada and Italy
had no reason to be included in a selective grouping
of self-styled global managers. The second was that
having the European Union (represented by its rotating
Council presidency) as a member along with individual
European countries like France, Germany and Italy
helps mollify other European aspirants. Third, by
having the Presidents of the IMF and the World Bank
as ex-officio invitees, without prior completion of
the much needed restructuring of their unrepresentative
management, ensures that the agencies that would be
chosen to implement decisions on global economic management
would be entities controlled by the US, UK and EU.
It has been widely noted that an IMF that had lost
its relevance before the current crisis, has won itself
a new lease of life and substantial influence after
the London G20 summit, even though it still advocates
the same policies that drove it to near-irrelevance.
Finally, it is noteworthy that the restriction of
membership from West Asia to Saudi Arabia (excluding
Iran) and the exclusion of a country like Venezuela
from Latin America (when Argentina, Brazil and Mexico
are at the table), keeps out countries from these
regions which the US would be uncomfortable with.
In sum, if expansion of the club responsible for managing
global capitalism was unavoidable, the G20 reflects
the combination which would be preferred by the leading
powers, taking account of the reality that excluding
China and Russia would have robbed the G20 of all
significance. Thus, the fact that the last three summits
in which the G20 was revived and given new stature
were held at Washington, London and Pittsburgh respectively
is perhaps of more than symbolic value.
In fact, the economic architecture that has the G20
at its centre though seemingly more democratic than
the one that had the G8 seeking to manage global affairs
is top-down in nature in two senses. It has a few
developing country members who claim to speak on behalf
of the developing countries as a whole, though they
are clearly engaged in seeking symbolic equality with
the developed (through permanent membership in the
United Nations Security Council or special exemption
from the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group,
for example). Further, the G20 as a group cannot fundamentally
challenge the increasingly anachronistic leadership
role of the G8 in general and the United States in
particular when it comes to redesigning capitalism.
It is to conceal these features that support for the
G20 is canvassed on the grounds that it includes countries
accounting for 85 per cent of world GDP and two-thirds
of the world’s population, while underplaying the
fact that the grouping includes only 19 of the United
Nations’ 192 members.
The argument in favour of a more selective club is
of course the fact that it facilitates reasonable
discussion and debate and aids decision making. But
the correctness and effectiveness of those decisions
from the point of view of the global community depends
on the extent to which these members represent the
combined or common interests of that community. Since
the current members of the G20 were not elected to
their self-assumed roles, there is reason to believe
that their membership and participation is driven
by their own self-interest. This could be of three
kinds. Countries could feel that their voice in global
affairs does not reflect their weight in the global
economy. Countries could feel that they are so involved
in global trade and capital flows that global developments
affect them substantially, though they have little
or no role in influencing those developments. And
countries, could feel that their participation in
global decision making is a part of a competitive
strategy to benefit from global economic development
and enhance their position within the global economy.
If it is the last two of these three objectives that
makes a country accept membership of the G20, then
it would not be seeking to represent others but attempting
to advance its own interests. With the whole of Africa,
excepting for South Africa, excluded, for example,
this can hardly deliver any economic justice globally.
In the event, the G20 would not serve as a platform
to manage global capitalism through consensus, but
merely as an arrangement that wins legitimacy for
a minor modification of the existing international
economic architecture despite its failure on many
fronts.
This is the direction in which the world seems to
be moving. Consider what has been achieved at the
end of the third summit of the G20 held over a period
of less than a year, other than for its elevation
to the role of global economic manager. There was
agreement that it is as yet too early to roll back
the fiscal stimulus that helped stall the economic
decline and begin a slow recovery. There were statements
against protectionism, but no concessions such as
withdrawal of the punitive measures adopted by the
US against imports of tyres and steel pipes from China.
There was little concrete progress on restructuring
the financial architecture other than for many pious
declarations promising to push ahead with and some
much-needed reforms of the international financial
system. The oft-repeated verbal commitment to institute
limited banking reform, in the form of ‘improved’
capital adequacy standards and regulation of derivatives
trading, was combined with a concession to popular
sentiment with references to bonuses of bank managers
and the need to avoid excessive risk taking. Actual
financial reform was focused on “old agendas” like
winning US agreement to Basel II standards, generating
consensus over a crackdown on tax havens, and reducing
bank leverage. In terms of global economic supervision,
while continuing with another name the existing (and
as yet ineffective) practice of IMF surveillance,
the summit has promised to redress the power imbalance
in global management by transferring at least 5 per
cent of the shares in the IMF and at least 3 per cent
of the vote share in the World Bank from over-represented
nations to emerging economies. The US would, of course,
retain enough shares to exercise a veto in the IMF.
As for the global poor, an already existing World
Bank-led programme to promote food security in the
world’s poorest countries was endorsed to signal a
concern for those excluded from the G20 club. And
a diversionary reference to an inadequately discussed
initiative on phasing out fossil fuel subsidies was
made. There is much more in the lengthy Communiqu,
but nothing that constitutes a fundamentally new thrust.
These might reflect diplomatic success, but is nothing
when it comes out of a third summit to frame a cooperative
response to the worst economic crisis the world has
seen after the Great Depression.
In practice, contentious issues like trade and climate
change were largely or completely sidestepped and
financial system reform was touched very lightly.
This points to the fact that the transition from G8
to G20 tutelage over the world economy has done little
other than slightly modifying and strengthening the
pre-existing global order, while increasing the money
spent on marketing the new framework. There are deep
structural reasons for this. Increased integration
through trade has made developing countries more dependent
on exports and heavily dependent on markets in the
developed countries, especially the US. Financial
liberalisation in a context where the dollar was the
world’s reserve currency has meant that much of the
world’s financial wealth is accumulated in dollar
denominated assets. And confidence in the dollar sustained
not by America’s competitiveness but by its role as
the watchdog of world capitalism makes it the preferred
target of any flight to safety. It is, therefore,
in the interest of most elites and governments0 to
cooperate with the US in the name of finding a solution
to the problems confronting global capitalism. But
finding a solution does not guarantee its implementation.
For the moment, what the US seems to have managed
is to initiate a process that would limit Europe’s
influence while creating space at the hegemon’s table
for a few “emerging” economies.
October
5, 2009.
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