It is now generally recognised that the very large
macroeconomic imbalances between the US and the rest
of the world, which are associated with very large
capital inflows into the US, are unsustainable beyond
a point. There is no doubt that the current situation
is absurd, and certainly counter to the perceived
role of international financial markets, which are
supposed to encourage flows of financial resources
from capital-rich to capital-poor economies.
Two of the richest large economies - the United States
and the United Kingdom - are net receivers of financial
resources, in the US case amounting to more than 6
per cent of GDP. The United States currently receives
slightly more than 70 per cent of total world savings
as capital inflows. Earlier, Japan and the Euro area
were the main financiers of the US deficits, but from
around 2001, developing countries, especially in Asia,
have become a significant source of such financing.
The newly industrialising countries of Asia (hereafter
Asian NICs) have been sending out more than 6 per
cent of GDP as capital outflow in the past three years.
All other developing countries taken together (including
China and India) are now exporting capital to the
tune of 4 per cent of GDP.
For the United States, this allows for economic expansion
based on foreign capital inflows, and also involves
a growing burden of foreign debt. Currently 52 per
cent of US Treasury Bills are held by foreigners,
up from 20 per cent only five years ago. But the consequences
for developing country governments which are increasingly
the holders of this debt may be even more significant.
This remarkable extent of outflow of capital from
the developing world obviously reflects an excess
of domestic savings over domestic investment. However,
this excess came about not because of any real increase
in savings rates in the aggregate, but because investment
rates have not gone up commensurately.
In the Asian NICs, the period of most significant
increase in net lending abroad was when domestic savings
rates were actually falling, because investment rates
were falling even faster. For all other developing
countries, net external lending has increased quite
sharply in the recent past mainly because investment
rates have stagnated even as savings rates have gone
up.
In most developing countries, the savings increase
has resulted from enhanced savings effort by the public
sector, and not from household or private corporate
savings. Therefore increases in domestic savings rates
in developing countries dominantly reflect fiscal
consolidation and expenditure cutbacks by their governments.
So the major reason for the apparent excess of capital
which is then being exported to the US and other developed
countries is deflationary policies on the part of
developing country governments, which suppress domestic
consumption and investment.
The Asian NICs have mostly been in fiscal surplus
since 2000, while the weighted average of fiscal deficits
for all other developing countries was less than 2
per cent of GDP last year and is projected to come
down to only 1 per cent of GDP in 2005. In the majority
of developing countries, where savings rates have
not increased, the increase in net lending abroad
has been generated by lower investment rates, driven
by compression of public investment.
This obviously has effects on current levels of economic
activity, but it also affects future growth prospects
because of the long-term potential losses of inadequate
infrastructure investment, etc. The deflationary effect
of this fiscal strategy is reflected in lower levels
of economic activity than could have been potentially
achieved, as well as higher levels of unemployment.
There has been an increase in open unemployment rates
across developing Asia, where there is hardly any
unemployment benefit or social security system.
The obvious question is: why are developing country
governments pursuing such an apparently counterproductive
policy which runs against the interests of their own
current and future economic growth? The answer lies
in a combination of international forces which have
been unleashed by the collective adoption of certain
national policies.
The first such force is the international domination
of finance, which has resulted from national policies
of financial deregulation, and created the possibility
of large possibly destabilizing movements of speculative
capital. It is certainly true that increasingly developing
country governments all guard against the possibility
of damaging capital flight by building up substantial
foreign exchange reserves even when these may involve
large fiscal losses.
But this is only part of the story. The second force
which is dominant in development strategy today is
the obsession with exports as the engine of growth.
Across the developing world, the basic stimulus to
growth is seen to come from increasing access to and
getting larger shares of the international market,
rather than building up the domestic market. Even
in countries which do not show large trade surpluses
at present, such as China and much of East Asia, the
stimulus to growth still is seen to come from exports.
Since all countries except the US are playing this
particular game, it follows that the US economy remains
the most important stimulus not only to world trade
but to world economic activity generally. Even for
countries like China, where exports to the US account
for only around one-fifth of total exports, this remains
the driving force for the accumulation which then
generates such high rates of aggregate growth and
in turn high aggregate savings.
In this context, domestic deflation in developing
countries becomes almost necessary to perpetuate the
system which provides the current pattern of growth.
By fuelling the US economic expansion, it ensures
a continuing market for exports by the rest of the
world. And central bank intervention to mop up the
dollars that are then invested in US securities ensures
that exchange rates do not appreciate to levels whereby
exports would be affected.
But this very obsession with export growth as the
means to development creates its own contradictions.
It leads to heightened competitive pressure (the famous
race to the bottom) which reduces unit values of exports
even as export volumes may increase. It prompts technological
changes in export and import competing industries
which mean that new production tends to generate less
employment, and therefore have lower domestic multiplier
effects. In any case, all developing countries together
cannot really hope to increase their share of world
markets unless they diversify their ultimate export
destinations. Most important, this strategy prevents
more sustainable and equitable patterns of economic
expansion based on the domestic market.
The peculiar paradoxes of the world economy today
therefore reflect not only the political economy structures
of international capitalism, but also policy choices
by developing country governments with respect to
both trade and finance. In such circumstances, financial
liberalisation and trade promotion can become the
means to undermine the development project in general.
October 31, 2005.
|