Not quite. One might first ask what
is the left, what does it mean to be left in 2006, and what does it mean
to be left in 2006 in Nicaragua. This is not to fall into a post modernist
relativist trap, because indeed there are permanent ''indicators'', as
it where, that throw light on the social and historical significance of
the return of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) to State
power.
The surest indicator that something is progressive socially is the attitude
of the United States Government, more so in its own ''backyard''. Throughout
the electoral campaign, as indeed ever since the FSLN's armed access to
power in 1979, Washington's position was one of hostility and active intervention.
The US Ambassador and three Bush Cabinet ministers appeared to be running
for office themselves in Nicaragua taking every public occasion to warn
the electorate of the dire consequences of an Ortega victory. Suspension
of aid, blocking of migrant remittances from the US (on which half of
the population depends directly or indirectly) formed part of the intimidation
campaign ultimately failed in preventing an Ortega victory, or indeed
in uniting the badly divided right wing Liberal Party to present the now
classical anti-Sandinista bloc that, numerically at least, still counts
with a majority electorate.
The second indicator of a progressive social content was the in that 38%
of the electorate that, through thick and thin, evidently hangs on to
the hope and the redemption represented by ''sandinismo''—the legacy of
Sandino and of the FSLN in its war against Somoza.
The incongruous question however is whether both the US government and
the Sandinista voters are making a big mistake in believing that the present
FSLN under the leadership (and control) of Daniel Ortega can or wishes
to break with the neoliberal model. This indeed may be the acid test of
what is left (and what is not left or is simply soft left). Such a distinction
needs to be made particularly among those, principally outside of Nicaragua,
that annoyingly are either welcoming or warning against the spread of
elected ''left'' governments in Latin America. There is of course of world
of difference between the governments of Cuba and Chile, Brazil and Venezuela,
or for that matter the ''left'' governing coalition in Uruguay whose policies
are indistinguishable if not worse than those of a neoliberal Costa Rica.
It would be dangerous in any case for wishful thinking to take the place
of hard analysis or to ignore the quite specific contexts of each national
setting. In Nicaragua it is well accepted across the board that there
was no ''left'' electoral mandate. In fact, it was there was no mandate
let alone left: Ortega won with approximately 39% of the electoral vote,
a percentage lower than that attained in previous elections when he instead
lost. In the past four elections including 2006, the FSLN has failed to
break through its ''electoral roof'' of some 41-42% where according to
the previous Constitution a 45% minimum was required to attain the Presidency
(mandating a run off if no candidate reached that minimum in a first round).
The Price of Power
In what will be recorded as a historical tragedy and ideological suicide,
Ortega's FSLN proceeded to elaborate a strategy for regaining office and
breaking through the numerical lock. First, he negotiated a much repudiated
constitutional change agreement (the ‘pacto') with Arnoldo Alemán,
former President who had recently been convicted for mass corruption.
Under the terms of the Pacto Alemán would be given first immunity
and then a pardon if necessary in return for the Legislative votes necessary
to effect a change in the Electoral Law bringing down to 35% the level
needed to win the Presidency in the first round. As part of the same strategy,
or through sheer luck, the Liberal Party suffered a division pitting the
followers of Alemán against a breakaway Liberal Party (Alianza
Liberal) headed by a US-approved technocrat banker, Eduardo Montealegre.
That division (bitterly criticised by the US) sealed the fate of the election
as neither faction reached 30% on its own (although together they counted
for 53%). A breakaway ''moderate'' Sandinista group—the Movimiento Renovador
Sandinista—scored a disappointing 9%.
Second, Ortega meticulously prepared a campaign (run by his wife Rosario
Murillo, now surely the second most powerful figure in the FSLN) to appeal
to every possible voter. Much to the shock of long time Sandinistas, Ortega
followed through his vague public embrace of ''peace, love and reconciliation''
by making political deals with long time political adversaries, including
leaders of the old Somoza party and the Contras, one of whom was hand-picked
for the Vice Presidential slot while others were promised prominent government
and legislative slots.
To the dismay of independent women's groups and liberation theology-minded
Christians, Ortega embraced the Catholic Church hierarchy taking communion,
receiving confession and even getting married to his common life partner.
And through the Church he reached out to the conservative catholic population
even to the point or ordering Sandinista legislators to support a repeal
of the century-old law permitting therapeutic abortion, allowing Nicaragua
to join Chile and El Salvador as the only Latin American countries with
such a reactionary position, the product of Pinochet era laws and of the
Jesuit-murdering regimes respectively.
Ortega also reached out unabashedly to Washington, international and Nicaraguan
financial capital, seeking in vain to mollify their historical animosity.
Nicaraguan social movements and independent NGOs were outraged as FSLN
deputies approved the Executive's neoliberal agenda including investment
treaties, privatizations of public utilities, corporate tax breaks and,
worst of all, the Central America Free Trade Agreement with the United
States (CAFTA). At the same time candidate Ortega promised to end poverty
and borrowed the Vatican's critique of ''savage capitalism'' (which was
to say, of course, that a non-savage capitalism is possible and that socialism
is not required). The Bush Administration was not convinced, but in the
end former President Carter, as an electoral observer, spoke to Secretary
Rice and asked that President-elect Ortega be given the benefit of the
doubt.
But neither Washington nor the capitalists are willing to concede that
easily. The strategy seems to be one of pushing Ortega to make even greater
concessions and make more promises, now actively supporting CAFTA and
the free market. Very likely the eventual cabinet appointments will probably
draw on candidates already being proposed by the business sector and by
the World Bank. Unsurprisingly, the every suspicious right is now demanding
that an Ortega government deliver on its market-friendly promises and
pro-private sector commitments.
What to Expect
This is not to say one must give up on a new Ortega government, which
in any case will be more than a personal proposition. The call is caution
and realism, given the new government's limitations both objective and
self-imposed, but not at the expense of the responsibility to build a
better world. If, as some suspect, the bid has been one for power at any
price and for power's sake, with the considerable capacity to exercise
patronage for loyal followers, that limited agenda will soon reveal itself
and no doubt it is one pushed by important figures in the FSLN.
But then there are other promises and expectations by and for the poor,
the FSLN´s historical supporters, who have suffered the indignities
of 16 years of neoliberalism. With 27% of the country undernourished,
massive emigration rates and equally massive dependence on remittances
and foreign aid, the fundamental priority should be on attacking hunger
and unemployment, while transcending the limits of the neoliberal model.
How an Ortega government will deal with the two constituencies remains
to be seen. What is certain is that the social movements and organizing
efforts will grow in strength and independence in the light of the new
government's existential ambiguities. At the very least, their role is
to exercise pressure to counter the already mobilizing force of capital
and the United States. How and if the Venezuelan government can inject
itself into this arena is not clear, but insuring a Venezuelan markets
for Nicaraguan primary produce deemed or made ''non-competetive'' in exchange
for oil products and fertilizers is a start.
What to Demand
Ortega may have carried the party to victory, but if it chooses to be
the progressive administrators of an ongoing neoliberal regime, then that
electoral victory will turn into historical defeat as the FSLN loses what
little is left of its revolutionary principles and values. Indeed, it
would spell the end of the FSLN in all but name.
If the international left chooses to give Ortega uncritical support, it
must also ask itself whether maquiavellian back room dealing are an acceptable
attribute of a left movement, as well as pose the question whether an
individual under credible accusations of sexual abuse of a minor should
can be reconciled with national and international acclamations. Hopefully
we on the left have learned that ideological and personal accountability
are not separate considerations. Which is to say, in our Nicaraguan context,
that we can draw on the same principles for socialism and sovereignty
that led to the creation of the FSLN in the first place. A new FSLN will
not only be possible, it will be necessary and inevitable.
November 17, 2006.
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