National and regional development is
still an all-important ongoing historical phenomenon. Among its many social,
economic and institutional determinants, social policies play a significant
role.
It only takes place over the backdrop of a singular tectonic social transformation
-it can only take place once in the history of peoples and nations - which
has causal determinations over the whole process, and is certainly determined
by it in return. The paper chooses to call this underlying phenomenon
"Immigration," mostly for political reasons.
This requires a little explanation. Regardless of horrendous past experiences,
a significant part of the people seemingly persists in the historically
damned behaviour of casting their periodic fears and insecurities into
hatred against vulnerable and easily identifiable minorities, mostly immigrants
nowadays, coming from emerging regions in general in the case of the developed
North, or from less developed neighbours in the emerging South. The paper
tries to cast this phenomenon in the framework of the wider process of
development, with the purpose of promoting a global view on the phenomenon
and the policies to deal with it.
In the case of LA, for example, the peak of urbanisation has already been
left behind and the rate of peasant migration has declined from a very
fast 0.8% of total population per year from the 1960s to the 1980s, to
a more moderate but still rapid 0.5% per year in the 1990s and 2000s.
However, in countries in the earliest stages of transition the rate is
still in its peak and even accelerating (Draibe-Riesco 2007, appendix
table 1).
Even at the present rate, LA governments have to deal with around three
million immigrants per year. As a reference, a recent study by Goldman-Sachs
showed that, from 2001 to 2005, the European Union-15 countries had been
receiving net immigrants from outside this region at a rate of 0.5% of
their total population per year, which number 1.74 millions per year.
In the larger EU25 the rate is lower and the net number of immigrants
from the outside is similar: 1.76 million per year (Financial Times 2007).
This is much less than those incoming into LA cities, most of which are
internal immigrants in countries early and moderate transition stages,
and especially those in full transition. However, many move across borders
as well, and arrive en masse to cities in LA countries already in advanced
transition stages.
In the world as a whole, assuming the same migration rate of second half
of the 20-century in LA, then peasant migration in the planet amounts
to the amazing figure of about 50 million people per year. This seems
not at all unreasonable considering that exactly half of the overall world
population today are peasants, much the same as LA in 1960s.
Certainly, the fears and worries of some inhabitants in the developed
North seem a bit exaggerated considering that even considering all the
developed countries, South-North immigrants ad up to much less than 10%
of the world total. Certainly, the governments of rich democracies should
be in a much better position to receive them than the developmentalist
States that have to deal with the remaining 90% or more.
Some would argue that in the latter case it is people of the same nationality.
However, this seems a rather short-sighted argument, because peasant immigrants
pouring into the cities of underdeveloped countries may be even more alien
than those who arrive in Europe or the US. They are discriminated by their
manners, language, looks, colour of their skin, tastes, smell, and certainly
for their neighbourhoods, if the places where they come to live in may
deserve such denomination. Sometimes, this assumes violent and even barbaric
forms, as recent events in South Africa and India, among others, well
remember us.
A more serious objection is the fact that part of migration has nothing
to do with peasantry at all. Developed economies are very dynamic and
constantly push masses of workers from one industry to another, the average
professional lives and works in two or three cities along their lives,
and many south-north immigrants are rather qualified technicians. All
this is certainly true, however, the numbers involved in these kinds of
migrations may well be in the hundreds of thousands or even millions per
year, but are one or two orders of magnitude away from the tens of millions
per year of ongoing peasant migration.
It is in China where immigration is seen truly in a development context.
The magnitude of the phenomenon is quite evident because the government
has the policy of assigning immigrants a legal status as such, at least
regarding the social policies to which they are entitled in their villages
but not in the cities where they work. In this way, China during the last
one or two decades has accumulated 140 million legal immigrants, and a
considerable number of unregistered ones on top of that. However, including
them, urban population is still around 44%, so it is yet not even halfway
through.
Considering this number, which exceeds the whole workforce of the US for
example, while at the same time witnessing the amazing impact of development
in this country, it is impossible not to realize the inextricable link
between one and the other.
However massive, China is the world in nutshell, so to say. It has taken
thousands of years for half of humanity to leave the land of their ancestors.
Most of it has taken place in the last two centuries, really. However,
at the present rate the other half will complete this journey within the
coming fifty years. The dimensions of this phenomenon dwarfs any other
in the socio economic space. Its impact on development of the emerging
world is evident. Furthermore, it also may be determining the most massive
movements in developed economies as well, such as secular economic cycles.
Once the concept is turned upside up, the research questions that arise
are many and fascinating. In the first place, it should be dimensioned
and described in a precise manner. How many immigrants are there globally?
Is their rate still increasing or has it already peaked and is now declining?
Where are the main movements taking place? What is the degree of completion
of the process in the different regions? In what conditions did the process
start and evolve in the different parts of the world? Are there certain
general economic laws that seem to be causing it in the different cases,
or is it caused by purely historical causes?
Other questions point to the relationship of immigration and development.
It is well known although seldom remembered that the premise for the emergence
of modern market economies is the previous existence of a massive and
fairly healthy and educated workforce, mostly urban but in any case freed
from the bondage of peasantry. It is also well known that when peasants
migrate their hands get the touch of Midas, because their work may be
as long and exhausting in the farms as it is in the cities, but only in
the latter most of its product is sold in the market and shows up in GDP.
However, there are many countries that can already exhibit a large proportion
of urban population and are nevertheless still quite backward. When is
that magic and terrible moment reached when this initial condition explodes
into a bustling modern market economy? Why does it occur? Which regions
of the world are now on the verge of that explosion? Which are the ones
where the "miracle" is already taking place? What are the projections
of the world when this process becomes complete?
The answers to these questions will certainly point towards the historical
and institutional aspects of development, and once again very especially
to the Developmentalist State and its social policies.
References
Draibe S, Riesco M (2007b). "Latin America: A new developmental welfare
state in the making?" In: Riesco M, ed. Latin America: A new developmental
welfare state in the making? Pp. 21-116. Basingstoke, Palgrave-Macmillan/UNRISD.
Financial Times 2007. "European immigration" www.ft.com Published:
August 20 2007 09:36