After
Japan and South Korea, China is arguably Asia's next
giant. Starting from a relatively egalitarian base,
in terms of asset and income distribution, created
during the years of central planning, it has over
the last two-and-a-half decades grown at a remarkable
pace within the framework of an increasingly market-friendly
regime. Per capita income has increased more than
four-fold from $168 in 1980 at 1995 prices to $727
in 1998. Growth over time was indeed uneven with the
annualised rate of growth of three-year-average GDP
figures rising from a little less than 7 per cent
in 1982 to a peak of close to 14 per cent in 1985,
then falling continuously to less than 6 per cent
by 1991, rising again to the above 13 per cent level
in 1994 and then falling to less than 8 per cent in
2000. However, the average rate of growth has indeed
been high.
This increase in per person incomes has occurred in
a period when China has witnessed major reform of
its economic policies, starting with reform in the
agricultural sector in 1978. Later, beginning in the
mid-1980s, China opened its economy to inflows of
goods and investment. Though a range of non-tariff
barriers still remain in place, the average tariff
rate on imports has fallen from 40 per cent in the
early 1990s to 15 per cent in 2001. Foreign investment
flows, which increased from around $1 billion a year
to $3.5 billion during the 1980s, mainly as a result
of investment in special economic zones, jumped to
$37.5 billion in 1995 and $40.3 billion in 1999. As
a result, during the second half of the 1990s, FDI
inflows amounted to over 5 per cent of GDP and accounted
for well over 10 per cent of gross capital formation.
There does seem to be evidence of a virtuous link
between such FDI flows and China's export performance.
In the event, China's exposure to trade has grown
substantially, with the ratio of imports plus exports
to GDP rising from 12 per cent in 1980 to 42 per cent
in 2000.
This and other evidence has been collated in a recently
released 800 plus-page study titled "China in
the World Economy: The Domestic Policy Challenges".
As is to be expected the study uses the link between
reform, growing trade dependence and high growth as
the basis for two generalisations. First, that if
appropriately carried out, a shift from an interventionist
to a market-friendly regime, which facilitates international
integration, is the best route to high growth. Second,
that to overcome the deceleration in growth that China
has been recently experiencing, the best strategy
would be intensify the reform effort. Thus, China's
commitments as part of its accession to the WTO, which
go far beyond what many other middle income countries
have adopted, is seen as a positive step forward.
However, while declaring that China's progress during
the economic reform era is one the great success stories
of the post-war era, the study points to a number
of emerging areas of concern in recent performance.
These include the evidence of a loss of dynamism in
industry and agriculture, of growing unemployment
and of substantial and rising regional disparity.
Grain production has stagnated in the early- and late
1990s fell in 2000 to its mid-1990s level. Industrial
growth has fallen quite sharply after 1993. The town
and village enterprises (TVEs), which were a much-noted
source of dynamism in the Chinese economy, are faced
with difficulties. This is of significance, since
the TVEs were the largest contributor to growth in
aggregate GDP and employment from the mid-1980s through
the early 1990s, and by 1996 employed 131 million
workers, or 28 per cent of the rural workforce. The
development of rural enterprises in turn has transformed
rural income generation, with more than 40 per cent
of rural incomes now coming from non-agricultural
activities. Unemployment has been on the rise, which
in its starkest form is reflected in the phenomenon
of "floating" migrant workers in search
of underpaid informal sector employment, estimated
at around 100 million. Finally, China's growth during
the 1990s has been accompanied by growing inequality
among its regions. Growth has been most rapid in the
coastal provinces, followed by provinces in the central
region, and least rapid in the western regions.
These trends have generated some degree of scepticism
regarding the evidence of rapid growth over long periods
in China as well as a degree of disillusionment with
the reform itself. Surprisingly, it is precisely at
this time that China has decided to accept extremely
tough conditions in terms of trade, foreign investment
and financial sector reform as commitments made in
return for WTO access. This, many argue, would not
merely ensure a qualitative shift in the nature of
the economic regime in China, but would accentuate
the tendency towards sluggish growth and weakening
welfare.
It is that argument that the OECD study seeks to challenge.
While admitting that the evidence is growing that
"the important engines that have driven China's
growth in the past have lost their dynamism",
the study advances two theses. First, it holds that
although China is even now as open as many WTO members
and though the depth and breadth of its WTO accession
commitments to increase access to its domestic economy
are far greater than those agreed to by previous adherents
to the WTO, China's accession is merely an important
and much-needed milestone in its reform path rather
than a change in direction. Second, to reverse the
tendency towards loss of dynamism and maximize the
benefits of the imminent increase in the openness
of its economy, China would have to go further than
its WTO commitments and undertake a set of complementary
and far-reaching reforms. The intent of the study
is clearly to remake China in the image of the developed
capitalist world, if that is possible at all, ostensibly
because "to reap the full benefits of further
integration in the world economy, the Chinese economy
must undergo fundamental adjustments."
There have been four elements to the reform in China
adopted so far. The process began with reform in the
agricultural sector, which displaced the pre-reform
commune economy. This was replaced with a household-based
system in which individual households that leased
land from the collectives were provided autonomy in
production decisions. Further, market forces were
given a greater role and government intervention in
the production, pricing and marketing of most crops,
excepting grains, was substantially reduced. Second,
the government permitted and sought to encourage investments
outside the state-owned industrial sector, initially
in the town and village and other collectively owned
enterprises, then in foreign funded enterprises and
more recently in domestic private enterprises. Third,
the government began to liberalise the import and
export trade, by reducing tariffs and easing non-tariff
barriers on a range of exports. Finally, the government
has sought to encourage foreign investment in special
economic zones and elsewhere.
Each of these the report argues contributed significantly
to increasing productivity and stimulating income
growth. The problem is that more recently their role
as stimuli has substantially waned. The waning of
the effects of these stimuli is attributed in large
part to the fact that the specific form which reform
took in each area had positive effects in particular
segments of the concerned sector. But once the slack
in those segments had been taken up, the persistence
of dynamism required not just the intensification
of reform in the affected segments, but the extension
of reform to other segments and to economy-wide policies.
While China's WTO access commitments partly do involve
such an extension, they would be inadequate if the
benefits from opening up are to be maximized.
In agriculture, the loss of dynamism is attributed
to the fact that there are now binding barriers to
increases in agricultural productivity. Fertiliser
use is already exceptionally high, pesticide application
cannot be increased because of environmental problems,
and there is a growing shortage of water in many areas.
This, according to the study, implies that agricultural
production must diversify away from land-intensive
to labour-intensive products like horticulture. But
such diversification is constrained by the grain procurement
system maintained for food security reasons, which
has ostensibly contributed to growing surpluses, falling
prices, reduced rural incomes and constrained rural
consumption.
This focus on the physical barriers to productivity
increase and the policy-induced constraints to diversification
because of the emphasis on grain production is not
just overstated. It also tends to underplay some of
the consequences of agricultural reform for welfare
and growth. Thus, according to some observers the
phenomenon of "floating" migrant workers
is in large measure the result of a loss of the institutional
ability to mobilize and utilize labour resources,
which was characteristics of the commune system of
production. An example of such utilization was the
pooling of off-season labour resources in building
rural infrastructure. The collapse of the latter not
only affected employment adversely, it also resulted
in the neglect of the maintenance and strengthening
of communal infrastructural facilities, with adverse
consequences for productivity. But a perspective which
has as its prior the view that Chinese reform was
positive but inadequate inevitably ignores such questions.
Consider also the puzzle as to why rural unemployment
has increased despite the success of the TVEs. The
growth of such enterprises in the rural as opposed
to the urban areas was partly because of the opportunity
for sustaining ancillary activity and contract work
at extremely low labour costs that excess labour resources
in rural areas provided. Temporarily, at least, the
government's decision to encourage TVEs as a part
of the process of "growing out of the plan"
worked because it facilitated the rural outsourcing
of such activities, to sustain low cost production,
including for export markets. As a result, the new
system appeared to be a better way of absorbing rural
surplus labour. However, evidence to the contrary
is growing. The demand for such outsourcing was inadequate
to absorb the growing rural labour surplus in full.
Further, such employment tended to be unevenly distributed.
Such industries have developed mostly in coastal provinces
and are reportedly much less visible in the interior
provinces, especially in the west of the country.
More recently, there are signs of stagnation and decline
in the TVE sector, with employment in rural enterprises
falling by close to 2.5 million since 1996.
Glossing over all this the OECD study asserts that
worsening TVE performance is due to fundamental structural
problems. These include financial problems, operating
inefficiencies, loss f competitiveness due to distance
from infrastructure. Hence, "even under optimistic
assumptions about how much their performance can be
improved, REs (rural enterprises) are unlikely to
be able to take up more than a fraction of the rural
workers who will need to find jobs outside the agricultural
sector."
What then is the answer? Urban industry does not offer
much of an alternative. The OECD's study points out
that: "As in agriculture, the dynamism to industry
imparted by structural shifts seems to be weakening.
Industry financial performance has deteriorated sharply
since the early 1990s. Profits fell to nearly zero
in 1998, with more than one-third of enterprises making
losses, and despite noticeable improvement during
1999-2001, financial performance remains weak in many
sectors. Growth in industry employment and capital
spending has declined markedly. The deterioration
has been pervasive and not simply confined to SOEs.
The performance of collective enterprises has worsened
nearly as much as that of SOEs; and the SME sector
generally is in particularly dire straits."
With foreign investment flows into China already far
in excess of other developing countries, and with
a predominant share coming from Hong Kong, Taiwan province of China
and other Asian countries with ethnic Chinese populations,
it is unlikely that this sector can even sustain its
growth, let along help employ the unemployed. In the
event, we are likely to see a worsening of unemployment,
because even the high growth associated with the unusual
combination of more than two decades of rapid expansion
accompanied by persisting and even growing unemployment
in the Chinese economy is no more a reality.
Given all this it should be obvious that this is hardly
the point in time when Chinese producers should be
subjected to increasing competition from imports and
state-owned enterprises should be restructured through
downsizing or outright closure. But these are inevitable
consequences of China's WTO accession commitments,
rendering the argument that this wide-ranging commitment
is an appropriate deepening of reform questionable.
But the study advances that argument by attributing
poor industry performance to inefficiency resulting
from wrong investment decisions and protection and
cost ineffectiveness because of social burdens imposed
on them. Even if this were true, reform in a period
when international competition is expected to increase
would only result in closure. And given the dependence
of many local industries on the SOEs, the process
is likely to be cumulative.
Yet, in the OECD's view, more reform is the answer.
"Trade and investment liberalisation should help
to improve some of the mechanisms needed to accomplish
the necessary restructuring, by increasing competition,
expanding opportunities for alliances between foreign
and domestic firms, and spurring government officials
to take measures to improve the business environment.
However, key obstacles that now exist to improvement
in industry performance, such as continued government
interference in enterprise management, poor financial
discipline, and restrictions on exit and other modalities
for re-deploying resources, need to be addressed if
the potential benefits of trade and investment liberalisation
are to be realised."
The difficulty is that the OECD's economists are not
even satisfied with the extent of reform implied by
WTO commitments. The study argues: "In China's
present situation, the outcomes of particular reforms
depend increasingly on the interaction among measures
taken by the economy's key actors - government, enterprises,
workers, and the financial system - acting in markets
whose functioning is shaped by key framework conditions
such as competition, property rights, and corporate
governance. Rather than emphasising particular sectors,
reforms now need to focus more on economy-wide policies
to promote more efficient allocation of resources
and to bolster the effectiveness of markets."
Two areas into which the extension of reform is emphasized
is the financial sector and macroeconomic policy.
Lamenting that the financial sector is still dominantly
state-owned, the report argues that credit is inefficiently
allocated, with state-owned enterprises obtaining
the bulk of funding, to ensure that they operate with
soft budget constraints. This is indeed true since
the role of credit in the Chinese system, hitherto,
was a means to realize targeted production as per
plan. If in the name of bank restructuring SOEs are
to be now starved of funds, leading to the collapse
of such enterprises, the banks themselves would not
be able to survive unless they are recapitalised by
the State. As the study itself notes: "In a proximate
sense, the ongoing problems of financial institutions
reflect the poor condition of their enterprise customers.
A severe vicious circle has developed. Poor enterprise
performance contributes to bank non-performing loans
and lowers bank profits by eliminating much of their
core market."
Banks after all cannot restore the health of real
economy enterprises. That has to be the result of
appropriate corporate restructuring and counter cyclical
macroeconomic policies. But with the customs duty
reductions and the tax rationalisation associated
with reform having reduced the revenues of the State
substantially, the manoeuvrability of the State is
already substantially circumscribed. Though "official
figures suggest that China's fiscal position is healthy
and that there is ample scope for fiscal expansion,"
this picture is misleading because it is widely acknowledged
that the government will need to take on debt obligations
not yet explicitly recognised. The main obligation,
the funds needed to restore solvency to financial
system, could more than double the government debt
ratio initially."
Given these factors the challenge in China is to restore
the room for manoeuvre of the state so that it can
restore some dynamism to the system. This would require
reducing rather than increasing China's integration
into the world system. But though its own analysis
points in that direction, the OECD given the predilections
of its member governments to obtaining a foothold
in the large, even if stagnating, Chinese market,
is forced to argue to the contrary.
For more details click on the below link:
China
in the World Economy: the Domestic Policy Challenge
March 25, 2002.
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