Document
presented to the United Nations Commission on Human
Rights at the meeting of its Sub-Commission on the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Fifty-fifth
session, held in Geneva, July 28 – August 15,
2003.
Published by the Monthly Review, January 2004.
The U.S. embargo against Cuba has been condemned by
a growing number, by now an overwhelming majority,
of member states of the United Nations General Assembly.
However, it remains in force by the U.S. government's
isolated but stubborn will, in spite of repeated UN
injunctions, notably its resolution 56/9 of November
27, 2001.The purpose of this exposé is to denounce
this embargo in the strongest terms as a violation
of law, and for its total lack of legitimacy. These
measures of arbitrary constraint are tantamount to
an undeclared act of war by the United States against
Cuba; their devastating economic and social effects
deny the Cuban people the ability to exercise their
basic human rights, and are unbearable for them. They
directly subject the people to extreme suffering and
infringe upon the physical and moral integrity of
the whole population, inflicting the greatest harm
on children, the elderly, and women. In this respect,
the embargo can be seen as a crime against humanity.
Imposed since 1962,the U.S. embargo was reinforced
in October 1992 by the "Cuban Democracy Act"
(or Torricelli Law),which aimed to restrain the development
of the Cuban economy's new driving forces by restricting
the inflow of funds and goods to Cuba by:
(1) strictly limiting the transfers of foreign currencies
by Cuban families in exile,
(2) banning from U.S. harbors for six months all ships
that had anchored in a Cuban port, and
(3) imposing sanctions against firms doing commerce
with the island even if under the jurisdiction of
a third state.
The embargo was further systematized by the "Cuban
Liberty and Democracy Solidarity Act" (Helms-Burton
Law) of March 1996, which aimed to harden the "international"
sanctions against Cuba. Its Title I generalizes the
ban on importing Cuban goods, demanding, for example,
that exporters give proof that no Cuban sugar has
been integrated in their products, as was already
the case with nickel. It conditions the authorization
of currency transfers to the creation on the island
of a private sector including employment of salaried
staff. Still more ambitious, Title II defines the
form of a transition to a "post-Castro"
power, and specifies the nature of its relationship
with the United States. Title III grants U.S. tribunals
the right to judge claims for damages made by a person
of U.S. nationality injured by the loss of property
in Cuba due to nationalization, and to demand compensation
from the users or beneficiaries of this property.
At the request of the old owners, nationals of a third
state, who have done business with these users or
beneficiaries, can be sued in the United States. The
sanctions incurred are set out in Title IV, which
permits, among other things, the State Department
to refuse U.S. entrance visas to the current owners.
Table
1: U.N. General Assembly Votes on Lifting
the Blockade |
|
For |
Against |
Countries Voting
Against |
1992 |
59 |
2 |
United States,
Israel |
1993
|
88 |
4 |
United States,
Israel, Albania, Paraguay |
1994
|
101 |
2 |
United States,
Israel |
1995 |
117 |
3 |
United States,
Israel, Uzbekistan |
1996
|
138 |
3 |
United States,
Israel, Uzbekistan |
1997
|
143 |
3 |
United States,
Israel, Uzbekistan |
1998 |
157 |
2 |
United States,
Israel |
1999 |
155 |
2 |
United States,
Israel |
2000 |
167 |
3 |
United States,
Israel, Marshall Islands |
2001 |
167 |
3 |
United States,
Israel, Marshall Islands |
2002 |
173
|
3 |
United States,
Israel, Marshall Islands |
2003* |
179 |
3 |
United States,
Israel, Marshall Islands |
*
In 2003, Morocco and Micronesia abstained
from voting. |
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The normative content of this embargo -specially
the extraterritoriality of its rules, which seek to
impose on the international community unilateral sanctions
by the United States, or the denial of the right of
nationalization -is a violation of the spirit
and letter of the United Nations Charter and the Organization
of American States, as well as of the very fundamentals
of international law. This excessive extension of
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States
is contrary to the principle of national sovereignty
and to that of non-intervention in the internal choices
of foreign states -as recognized in the jurisprudence
of the International Court of Justice. The embargo
opposes the Cuban people's rights to self-determination
and to development. It also forcefully contradicts
the freedom of trade, navigation, and movement of
capital -all of which the United States paradoxically
advocates everywhere else in the world. This embargo
is moreover illegitimate and immoral because it attacks
the social benefits realized by Cuba in recent years
and imperils their success -recognized by many
independent international observers (in particular
those of the WHO, UNESCO, UNICEF, and many other non-governmental
organizations). These successes include the public
systems of education, research, health, and culture.
Furthermore, the threat that this coercive operation
poses for U.S. nationals and foreigners extends the
practical impact of the embargo to areas completely
or partially excluded from the statutes, such as food,
medicines or medical equipment, and the exchange of
scientific information.
Economic Harms of the Embargo
According to Cuba's Report to the United Nations
Secretary-General on the U.N.'s General Assembly
Resolution 56/9 (2002), the direct economic damages
to Cuba's economy, caused by the U.S. embargo
since its institution, would exceed seventy billion
dollars. The damages include:
(1) the loss of earnings due to the obstacles to the
development of services and export (tourism, air transport,
sugar, nickel);
(2) losses registered as a result of the geographic
reorientation of the commercial flows (additional
costs of freight, stocking, marketing, and purchasing
of the commodities);
(3) the limits imposed on the growth of the national
production of goods and services (due to limited access
to technologies, lack of access to spare parts and
hence early retirement of equipment, forced restructuring
of firms, and serious difficulties sustained by the
sectors of sugar, electricity, transportation, and
agriculture);
(4) monetary and financial restrictions (the impossibility
of renegotiating the external debt, interdiction of
access to the U.S. dollar, unfavourable impact of
the variation of exchange rates on trade, risk-country
rating, and additional costs of financing due to U.S.
opposition to the integration of Cuba into the international
financial institutions);
(5) the pernicious effects of the incentive to emigration,
including illegal emigration (the loss of human resources
and talents generated by the Cuban educational system);
and
(6) social damages affecting the population (concerning
food, health, education, culture, and sports).
In addition to negatively affecting all these sectors,
the embargo directly impedes -aside from export
-the driving forces of the Cuban economic recovery,
the strongest of which are tourism, foreign direct
investments (FDI), and currency transfers.
Many European subsidiaries of U.S. firms have recently
broken off negotiations for the management of hotels
because their lawyers anticipated that the contracts
would be sanctioned under the provisions of the Helms-Burton
law. In addition, the purchase by U.S. groups of European
cruise lines, which moored their vessels in Cuba,
was cancelled in 2002-2003.The obstacles imposed by
the United States, in violation of the Chicago Convention
on International Civil Aviation, on the sale or the
rental of planes, to the supply of kerosene and to
access to new technologies (such as e-reservations
and radio location), will lead to a loss of $150 million
in 2003.
The impact on FDI is also very unfavourable. The institutes
that promote FDI in Cuba received proposals for more
than five hundred projects in cooperation with U.S.
companies, but none of them could be realized -not
even in the pharmaceutical and biotechnological industry,
where Cuba has a very attractive potential.
Transfers of currency from the United States are limited
to less than US$100 a month per family, and some European
banks have had to reduce their commitments under pressure
from the United States, that let them know indemnities
would be required if loans were maintained. In Cuba,
the embargo penalizes the activities of a range of
sectors throughout the economy: banking and finance,
insurance, petroleum, chemical products, construction,
infrastructures and transportation, shipyards, agriculture
and fishing, electronics and computing, as well as
the export sectors where U.S. owned enterprises prevailed
before 1959, such as sugar, whose recovery is impeded
by its exclusion from the international commodities
exchange in New York.
Social Harms of the Embargo
The U.S. government's announcements intimating
that it would favour the relaxation of the restrictions
concerning foodstuffs and medicines are not credible
and cannot obscure the fact that Cuba has been the
victim of a de facto embargo in these areas. The reduction
of the availability of these types of goods exacerbates
the privation of the population and constantly threatens
its dietary security, its nutritional stability, and
its health. A humanitarian tragedy -which seems
to be the implicit objective of the embargo -has
been avoided only thanks to the will of the Cuban
state to maintain at all costs the pillars of its
social model, which guarantees to everyone, among
other things, staple foods at modest prices and the
free provision of food in nurseries, schools, hospitals,
and homes for the elderly. That is the reaffirmation
of the priority given by the authorities to human
development, which explains the established excellence
of the statistical indicators of Cuba concerning health,
education, research, and culture, and this despite
the extremely limited budgets and the numerous problems
resulting from the disappearance of the Soviet bloc.
However, the continuation of the social progress in
Cuba is impaired by the effective extension of the
embargo. According to the American Association of
World Health, the pressures exerted by the U.S. State
Department and Department of Commerce on the suppliers
of Cuba have affected the availability of a wide range
of goods necessary for healthcare (including medicines
destined to pregnant women, laboratory products, radiology
equipment, operating tables and surgical equipment,
anaesthetics, defibrillators, artificial breathing
apparatuses, dialysis apparatuses, and pharmaceutical
stocks) and went as far as to prevent the free supply
of food for newborns and equipment for paediatric
intensive care units. Cuba 's capacity to produce
vaccines it has developed is hampered by the frequent
lack of spare parts and essential components that
have to be imported, as well as water treatment centres.
This embargo inflicts an unjustified suffering of
the Cuban people. The resulting shortages of many
medicines not produced in Cuba complicate the immediate
and complete implementation of treatment protocols
for breast cancer, leukaemia, cardiovascular and kidney
diseases, as well as treatment of HIV. Moreover, the
U.S. authority's infringements on individual freedom
of movement and scientific knowledge -restrictions
on travel of U.S. researchers, the disrespect of bilateral
agreements on Cuban researcher's visas, refusals to
grant software licenses or to satisfy the orders from
Cuban libraries for books, reviews, or electronic
media of specialized scientific literature - have
in fact extended the embargo to areas formally excluded
from it by law. One of the most potentially fruitful
opportunities to develop humanitarian cooperation
on a basis of solidarity between nations is therefore
blocked.
The embargo is also in contradiction with the principles
of the promotion and protection of human rights, which
the people of the United States desire for themselves
and for the rest of the world.
For all these reasons, this unacceptable embargo has
to cease immediately.
January 13, 2004.
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