It
is not just outsiders who find the Enron scandal outrageous.
Insiders at the company apparently found its conduct
shocking, too.
Last August, four months before Enron filed for bankruptcy,
a senior executive named Sherron Watkins wrote to
Enron's chairman, "I am incredibly nervous that
we will implode in a wave of accounting scandals."
She conceded that "a lot of accountants,"
including Arthur Andersen, "have blessed the
accounting treatment," but she insisted that
"none of that will protect Enron if these transactions
are ever disclosed in the bright light of day."
And she noted that she was not alone; two other senior
executives had also voiced objections. A midlevel
employee had told her: "I know it would be devastating
to all of us, but I wish we would get caught. We're
such a crooked company."
Two reasons seem to explain why this crooked behavior
- which cheated ordinary investors of millions of
dollars - took place despite protests from within
the company. The first is the character of Enron's
leadership. The executives who set up the shell companies
that masked Enron's true financial profile were consciously
trying to deceive investors, including many of their
own staff who had bet their retirement funds on Enron
stock.
These executives knew they were acting dishonorably,
which is why they appear to have deliberately silenced
doubters. One of the doubters mentioned in the Watkins
letter, Jeff McMahon, the company treasurer, was moved
into a different job after questioning the shell companies.
And when the letter reached Kenneth Lay, Enron's chairman,
Mr. Lay's response was to ask Vinson Elkins, Enron's
law firm, to look into the matter. But the letter
had pointed out the firm's conflict of interest: Vinson
Elkins had apparently approved some of the deals that
started the shell game.
The other reason why Enron behaved scandalously is
that the accounting rules themselves are a scandal.
It is clear that Enron's shell companies cheated investors
and appalled company insiders; it is clear that they
throw into question the whole basis of stock market
capitalism, which is that investors assign values
to corporations by scrutinizing their accounts. And
yet, unbelievably, it is not clear that these shell
companies were illegal.
Equally, it is known that Enron's auditors spotted
$51 million worth of problems in Enron's accounts
back in 1997, yet they felt able to certify the accounts
as accurate because the discrepancies were not "material."
Rules that permit this sort of discretion are unworthy
of the name.
Harvey Pitt, chairman of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, says he wants a new system for policing
auditors. His concern is welcome. As he weighs the
various reform options, he should keep in mind one
passage from the Watkins letter: "The overriding
basic principle of accounting is that if you explain
the 'accounting treatment' to a man in the street,
would you influence his investing decisions?"
It is extraordinary that any executive should feel
the need to point this out to a corporate chairman.
Mr. Pitt should not rest until chairmen start to behave
differently - until accounts really do convey the
information that investors need to make decisions.
MORE ON ENRON
>>
January 22, 2002.
[Source: The Washington Post, January 18, 2002]
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