Myanmar is an enigma. Listed in international
statistics as the poorest country in Asia and one of the poorest among
the world's 49 least developed countries, and politically ostracised because
of its continuous record of human rights violations, the self-imposed
insulation and the externally created isolation of the country have resulted
in many misconceptions. Even the country's name is a puzzle - since the
military regime changed the name to Myanmar, it is the designation used
by the UN and international media. In some ways, despite its association
with the military, it is actually a name more reflective of the country's
diverse citizenship than the former name Burma which suggested that the
country is comprised merely by the citizens speaking the - majority -
Burman language.
A spirit of guarded optimism is palpable at this moment in the country
- a hope that Myanmar may be at an albeit fragile crossroads towards at
least marginally more democracy and first steps towards more equitable
economic and social development and human rights.
How valid and realistic are these expectations? Myanmar presents the researcher
and policy analyst with many enigmas, since data are inconsistent. Constructing
a picture from a host of sources suggests a country which is more complex
and sophisticated than that conveyed by the media and official reports.
To begin with, the economy presents a split picture. Government data claim
12% GDP growth for the past decade - a figure which seems improbable,
while IMF or ADB figures of 4-5% real per capita growth may underestimate
the economic growth trajectory. Much of the country's economic activity
is not recorded, notably the investment from and exports of natural gas,
hydropower, timber, or gemstones to China, Korea, Thailand, Singapore,
and India. One segment of the economy is characterised by massive high-tech
infrastructure projects such as the new national capital, Naypidhaw, constructed
greenfield in the barren centre of the country, several state-of-the-art
airports, four-lane national highways, bridges over the Irrawaddy and
other streams, and a slew of hydropower dams. On the other hand, 60% of
the population subsist on agriculture where no mechanisation or irrigation
investment or rural feeder road or footpath development has taken place
in decades, there are limited options for diversification, no social protection
measures and, and access to credit has only started in the past few months.
Per capita income estimates range from $220 - the UN estimate - to $800,
or $1100 in purchasing power parity, presented by local economic analysts.
The government-defined poverty line has reportedly decreased to 27%, from
32% in the earlier years of the decade. There are no data on income inequality,
but it is obvious even to the casual observer that the disparities are
enormous between the military and the emerging class of investors on the
one hand who monopolise the large-scale business contracts, and the rural
population and the ethnic minority peoples. An estimated 35% of the population
reside in the ethnic minority states on Myanmar's borders with India,
Bangladesh, China and Thailand. Estimates on the numbers of informal migrants
to Thailand and beyond range from 1 to 2 million persons, with the majority
coming from ethnic minority communities and working in Thailand and beyond
in unsecured, dangerous, underpaid jobs. An estimated 400 000 men are
in the army, 200 000 in the police forces, and another 400 000 in the
monkhood; if these figures are correct, this would meant that one million
people are ''employed'' by these vast formalised institutions.
Overall, Myanmar's economic policy reminds of development strategies of
the 1950s, where prestige infrastructure projects for roads or electricity
were the focus of government investment. Investment into agriculture,
until recently considered an economic backwater, and into human capital,
has been systematically neglected by successive military regimes. However,
a generation handover appears to be raising awareness for the need to
invest in people and in the rural economy, if Myanmar wants to catch up
with the knowledge economy and move up the value chain.
Social development presents another contradictory picture. Taken at face
value, and not disaggregated by regions within the country, by ethnicity,
or religion, Myanmar appears ''on track'' towards achieving some of its
targets in the Millennium Development Goals. But as is well-known, the
MDGs are unsatisfactory indicators of progress. As elsewhere in Asia,
child malnutrition is a huge challenge - according to Unicef data, one
third of Myanmar children under 5 are undernourished. Infant and child
mortality rates are 71/1000 and 98/1000 respectively, far worse than the
rates observed in neighbouring countries. Primary school enrolment is
84 %, but school completion rates, the actual level of knowledge acquired
or progression to secondary and tertiary education are dismal - in a country
which at independence was a higher education hub for all of southeast
Asia.
Indeed, the estimates for government expenditure on health and on education
at roughly 1% of GDP each are among the lowest in the world. This means
that most health and education expenditures are financed or co-financed
privately by out of pocket payments, and these are supplemented by the
philanthropy of citizens, international NGOs, selected UN agencies, and
the diaspora and people interested in Myanmar, which keep the education
and health systems afloat.
Politically, too, the landscape is more complicated than conventionally
portrayed: often, it is often simplified as a standoff between the opposition
party National League for Democracy (NLD) and the military. However, there
are more dissident groups than the NLD. More than 2000 political prisoners
remain incarcerated with no public access, and the numbers of monks and
other citizens killed in the 2007 protest movement is not clear. Torture
and rape of political prisoners and forced labour are rife. Freedom of
the press and freedom of association do not exist; websites with critical
information are blocked by the government.
In addition to political opposition to the human rights violations, there
is the historically inherited divide between the Burmans who live in the
country's lowlands and the highland ethnic minority groups. Burmans led
the independence movement, while the ethnic minorities were conscripted
into British colonial forces and were seen to have remained loyal to the
British Empire. Moreover, Burmans are in majority Buddhist, while many
of the ethnic minorities were Christianised in the colonial period. Of
the 25 armed ethnic minority groups, 17 have signed a peace agreement
while two have been at war with the government since the 1950s. The minorities
continue to enjoy much attention, including ODA from OECD countries and
NGOs, and are therefore seen as a foreign-supported threat to national
unity which provides the government a pretext for their persecution.
Against this complex backdrop, the Parliament and 14 state legislatures
are beginning to convene for the first time in two decades from 31 January.
25 per cent of the Parliamentary seats are military appointees, the other
75 per cent are members elected in the elections in autumn 2010, which
were not ''free and fair'', as many citizens were coerced to vote for
the military's National Unity Party. The NLD, led by Aung San Suu Kyi,
did not stand in the elections, as they did not want to legitimise the
new constitution nor negate the 1990 election results where they had carried
the majority. Other parties did join, some ethnicity based, as well as
a political group that left the NLD. Together these will now form a small
opposition in the Parliament of about 25 per cent.
The parliament will, in some form, need to decide on crucial questions
such as fiscal budget allocations or new legislation. This may be especially
so at the state legislature level, where the representatives will be closer
to the citizens. This may offer opportunities for accountability and transparency
- if only to ensure their re-election in 5 years. The presence of even
a small opposition could begin to challenge the political culture of one-man
military decision making - and this small opening is what has created
the current guarded optimism. Indeed, some observers argue that the absence
of the NLD in the parliamentary opposition may turn out to be a missed
opportunity for putting their policy alternatives on the discourse table.
Draft legislation on freedom of association in formal sector businesses,
and on a reform of the social security system, are examples were small
socio-economic improvements may become possible.
A linchpin in Myanmar politics - domestically and internationally - are
the investment, trade and tourism sanctions imposed, in various formats,
for the past two decades by the US and the European Union. They too are
an enigma, since other countries with similar human rights violations
and dictatorial regimes have not been subjected to such sanctions - China,
Egypt, or Vietnam are cases in point. While human rights abuse cannot
be weighed against each other, it can nevertheless be argued that the
EU and US sanctions, singling out Myanmar, are harming the vulnerable
people they are purportedly meant to support, and - inadvertently - playing
into the hands of the military and of the economic interests of Myanmar's
powerful neighbours - most significantly China. In the absence of ''Western''
investment and ODA, the blocking of exports, and the discouragement of
tourism, Myanmar lacks access to diversified sources of technical expertise,
to professional differences of opinion, and to critically informed screening
processes. The large hydropower schemes and natural and pipelines, for
example, are not subjected to any democratic decision making process,
the scrutiny of media or civil society, or even to technocratic social
or environmental impact screening. ODA from China or India is not guided
by the MDG agenda nor human rights or environmental concerns, but by unbridled
commercial and resource interests. The forthcoming privatisation of public
enterprises will not be able benefit from transparent processes or competition
among a range of domestic and foreign investment bids.
The sanctions need to be revisited. It is problematic to lift sanctions
in one go, as this could be seen as endorsing the current regime, erroneously
signalling that human rights abuses have abated, and may be portrayed
as serving another set of vested interests. However, maintaining the sanctions
serves the interest of the powerful military and their economic partners,
deprives the citizens and critical voices in the country of the international
support they so much deserve, and may merely serve to prolong the unjust
political, economic and social situation.
In sum, Myanmar is an underestimated economy, and a country seen in a
black-white mode, instead of its deep - and troubled - complexity. This
means that the people of Myanmar are deprived of opportunities for more
diversified sources of livelihoods, and that the all-crucial agenda of
human rights is jeopardised. Research on and engagement with Myanmar by
the progressive international civil society and academic communities needs
to stepped up urgently, if the current ''crossroads'' optimism is to usher
in rights-based, inclusive human development and social justice.
Sources and references:
Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Outlook. Manila 2010. www.adb.org
ESCAP/ADB/UNDP. Achieving the Millennium Development Goals in an Era of
Global Uncertainty. Asia-Pacific Regional Report 2009/10. http://www.mdgasiapacific.org/regional-report-2009-10
Karlekar, Hirlanmay, The general in his labyrinth. Himal Magazine Sept.
2010, p. 21. www.himalmag.com
Kivimäki, Timo and Paul Pasch, The Dynamics of Conflict in the Multi-ethnic
Union of Myanmar. Friedrich Ebert Foundation- Berlin 2009
Rieffel, Lex, The Economy of Burma/Myanmar on the Eve of the 2010 Elections.
United States Institute of Peace. Special Report. May 2010. www.usip.org
Steinberg, David, Burma/Myanmar. What everyone needs to know. Oxford.
Oxford University Press 2010
Thant Myint-U, The River of Lost Footsteps. Histories of Burma. Faber
and Faber. London 2007
UNICEF, State of the World's children. New York 2010. www.unicef.org
United Nations General Assembly, Situation of human rights in Myanmar.
Note by the Secretary-General.Promotion and protection of human rights
situations and reports of special rapporteurs and representativesA/65/368.
http://www.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/534/77/PDF/N1053477.pdf?Open
Walton, Matthew, Ethnicity, Conflict and History in Burma. The Myth of
Panglong. Asian Survey Vol 48. www.Ucpressjournals.com
Will, Gerhard, Birma nach den Wahlen: Gelenkter Systemwandel oder drohender
Staatszerfall? Berlin, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. 2011. http://www.swp-berlin.org/de/produkte/swp-aktuell/swp-aktuell-detail/article/birmamyanmar-nach-den-wahlen.html
http://www.networkmyanmar.org/