Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz has written
an article in the Financial Times dated April 1, 2011 arguing that a substantially
enhanced issue of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) by the IMF should be the
first step in the reform of the international monetary system. The article
is of special significance because it is based on a statement issued by
18 leading economists from across the globe calling themselves the Beijing
Group, which includes nine known Chinese figures.
Few would object to the idea that the IMF must further enhance the allocation
of SDRs and alter its distribution to help countries deal with situations
of balance of payments stringency. But it is difficult to believe that
the issue of SDR's would offer a solution to the problem that the United
States and the dollar do not have the requisite economic strength to warrant
the dollar's status as the world's reserve currency. The problem is that
the US is not the world's most competitive economy, that the dollar has
for long not been backed by gold, and that there are just too many dollars
circulating globally and too much wealth invested in dollar denominated
assets to ensure confidence in the currency. Yet, there is no other currency
that appears likely to emerge as an alternative in the foreseeable future.
The Beijing Group advances three arguments in support of the SDR as an
alternative reserve. The first is its view that it is because a national
currency such as the dollar serves as reserve that the burden of adjustment
to balance of payments imbalances falls on deficit countries, resulting
in a global recessionary bias. Second, that the use of a national currency
like the dollar as reserve forces the US to run unsustainable current
account deficits to ensure that there is adequate global liquidity, and
raises the danger that any effort of the US to shrink those deficits can
generate global difficulties. And, third, that the dollar as reserve forces
developing countries to accumulate large surpluses to ''self-insure''
themselves against future balance of payments crisis.
There are two difficulties associated with this line of reasoning. One
is that the reading of the global economy and its functioning implicit
in each of these arguments is questionable. The second is that even if
the reasoning is correct it does not explain why the SDR is an alternative.
Implicit in the Beijing Group's statement is the assumption that global
problems arise solely or substantially because global outcomes result
from the interaction of independent nation states. This underestimates
the role of large corporations and finance capital. Once we take account
of the motivations that drive corporations, especially the obvious one
of maximising profits, an important determinant of the distribution of
current account surpluses and deficits in a world of globally mobile capital
and technology is the search of transnational firms for low cost production
locations. Such locations normally tend to be a few countries with a large
reserve of cheap labour. As a result the most productive, best-practice
technologies get combined with cheap labour, raising the level of global
surpluses and inducing an underconsumptionist, deflationary bias into
the system. It is difficult to see how just the availability of more of
any reserve would counteract this tendency.
The reserve accumulation in some countries resulting from this process
is compounded by flows of purely financial capital, encouraged by the
accumulation of relatively cheap liquidity in the global financial system.
That has resulted, inter alia, from the US government's exploitation of
its position as the home of the world's reserve currency to function as
if it faces no national budget constraint and undertake huge expenditures
abroad aimed at maintaining its hegemony. The deficits associated with
such expenditure have in turn been financed by the reverse flows of dollar
surpluses invested in dollar-denominated assets. Hence, it is unlikely
that the US would agree to a substantially enhanced issue of SDRs in order
to create an alternative reserve that would deprive it of access to a
global mint.
Can the SDR serve as alternative reserve? Created in 1969, the SDR was
initially seen as a supplemental reserve which could help meet shortages
of the two then prevailing reserve assets: gold and the dollar. The IMF
issues credits of SDRs to its member nations, which can be exchanged for
freely usable currencies when required. The value of the SDR was initially
set to be equivalent to an amount in weight of gold (0.888671 grams) that
was then also equivalent to one U.S. dollar. After the collapse of the
Bretton Woods system in 1973, however, the value of the SDR was reset
relative to a weighted basket of currencies, which today consist of the
euro, Japanese yen, pound sterling, and U.S. dollar, and quoted in dollars
calculated at the existing exchange rates. The liquidity of the SDR is
ensured through voluntary trading arrangements under which members and
one prescribed holder have volunteered to buy or sell SDRs within limits.
Further, when required the Fund can activate its ''designation mechanism'',
under which members with strong external positions and reserves of freely
usable currencies are requested to buy SDRs with those currencies from
members facing balance of payments difficulties. This arrangement helps
ensure the liquidity and the reserve asset character of the SDR. So long
as a country's holdings of SDRs equal its allocation, they are a costless
and barren asset. However, whenever a member's SDR holdings exceeds its
allocation, it earns interest on the excess. On the other hand, if a country
holds fewer SDRs than allocated to it, it pays interest on the shortfall.
The SDR interest rate is also based on a weighted average of specified
interest rates in the money markets of the SDR basket currencies.
The volume of SDRs available in the system is the result of mutually agreed
allocations (determined by the need for supplementary reserves) to members
in proportion to their quotas. Till recently the volume of SDRs available
was small. Since than SDRs have been allocated on four occasions. An overwhelming
proportion of the allocation has occurred in the aftermath of the 2008
financial crisis. But even now the quantum of these special reserves is
well short of volumes demanded by developing countries.
Does the recent large increase in the amount of SDR's allocated herald
its emergence as an alternative to the dollar? There are two roles that
the SDR can play, which favour its acceptance as a reserve. First, it
can help reduce the exposure of countries to the dollar, the value of
which has been declining in recent months because of the huge current
account deficit of the US, its legacy of indebtedness and the large volume
of dollars it is pumping into the system to finance its post-crisis stimulus
package. Second, since its value is determined by a weighted basket of
four major currencies, the command over goods and resources that its holder
would have would be stable and even advantageous.
There are, however, five immediate and obvious obstacles to the SDR serving
as the sole or even principal reserve. First, the volume of SDRs currently
available are distributed across countries and is a small proportion of
the global reserve holdings estimated at $6.7 trillion at the end of 2008
and of the reserve holding of even a single country like China. Since
all countries would if possible like to hold a part of their reserves
in SDRs, the fraction of the SDR hoard that would be available for trade
against actual currencies would be small, implying that even with recent
increases in allocations the SDR can only be a supplementary reserve.
Second, expansion of the volume of SDRs in circulation requires agreement
among countries that hold at least 85 per cent of IMF quotas. With the
US alone having a close to 17 per cent vote share, as of now it has a
veto on any such decision. It is unlikely to go along with the decision
to deprive it of the benefits of being the home of the reserve currency.
Third, since SDR issues are linked to quotas at the IMF and those quotas
do not any more reflect the economic strength of members, the base distribution
of SDRs is not in proportion to the distribution of reserve holdings across
countries. Reaching SDRs to those who would like to hold them depends
on the willingness of others to sell as noted earlier. Fourth, since the
value of the SDR is linked to the value of four actual currencies, the
reason why a country seeking to diversify its reserve should not hold
those four currencies (in proportion to their weights in the SDR's value)
rather than the SDR itself is unclear. This would also give countries
flexibility in terms of the proportion in which they hold these four currencies
(which is an advantage in a world of fluctuating exchange rates, since
weights in the SDR are reviewed only with a considerable lag, currently
of five years). Finally, as of now SDRs can only be exchanged in transactions
between central banks and not in transactions between the government and
the private sector and therefore in purely private sector transactions.
This depletes its currency-like nature in the real world. It also reduces
the likelihood that a significant number of economic transactions would
be denominated in SDRs.
Thus, the idea of a wholly new currency serving as a unit of account,
a medium of exchange and a store of value at the international level does
appear a bit far-fetched. The denomination of trade in that currency,
the issue of financial assets denominated in that currency and the quantum
and distribution across countries of the currency issued have to be all
decided jointly and with consensus. That does appear near impossible as
of now.