In
an announcement that sounds tiresomely routine, China
has been identified as having crossed one more economic
landmark. In mid-March 2011, consultancy firm IHS
Global Insight released a study which suggests that
China has become the world's largest manufacturing
nation. The data from IHS Global Insight estimates
that in current dollars, world manufacturing output
in 2010 was $10,078 billion. That reflects an inflation-adjusted
growth of 9.7 per cent relative to 2009. That is good
news for the US and other G8 governments looking for
signs of a recovery. But what may not be good news
for them is that China accounted for 19.8 per cent
of that production, which places the country for the
first time, after (reportedly) more than 150 years
(Financial Times, March 14, 2011), at the top of the
global league in terms of manufacturing output share.
The US which followed with 19.4 per cent has been
displaced from its more than 100 year presence as
the largest manufacturing nation in the world. With
manufacturing might still considered a reflection
of a nation's true economic strength, this does constitute
an important milestone in China's development history.
This news comes not long after the announcement that,
measured in terms of nominal GDP converted to dollars
at official exchange rates, China had, in 2010, overtaken
Japan as the world's second largest economy. Figures
from Japan released recently showed that Japan's nominal
gross domestic product was worth $5,474 billion in
2010 compared with China's $5,879 billion. That too
was a significant milestone. For many years before
that China had been ahead of Japan only when GDP was
measured in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms. PPP
is an indicator that takes into account relative prices
and therefore the command over goods that a dollar
of income provides. Since with lower wages and prices,
a dollar in China when converted to RMB delivers more
purchasing power, Chinese GDP measured in PPP dollars
is significantly higher than at official exchange
rates. Hence, becoming the world's second largest
economy at official exchange rates did mark an important
transition. There are only two features that seem
to discount this achievement. The first is that though
it has overtaken Japan, China is far behind the US,
with less than two-fifths of its GDP in nominal terms.
The second is that with a population of more than
1.3 billion, when compared with Japan's 128 million
and the United States' 307 million, China's per capita
nominal GDP in 2009 was less than a tenth that in
both Japan and the US.
Assessments of this kind are likely to be invoked
to dilute the significance of China's achievement.
The arguments that would be resorted to would be diverse.
One of course would be that China has managed to garner
this success not because of its technological prowess
or manufacturing discipline, but because of the use
of its large and cheap reserve of labour as well as
hidden and/or open subsidies from the state. That
argument would be strengthened by referring to the
role of US (and other) multinationals which have relocated
capacities to China in the latter's manufacturing
export success. The latter is crucial.
Exports have been particularly important for manufacturing
growth in China. The exports of manufactured products
rose at 20 per cent per annum between 2000 and 2009,
and the share of manufactured exports in total exports
rose from 88 to 95 per cent. It is also true that
foreign-invested firms account for a large share of
manufactured exports from China and that the ratio
of manufactured exports to aggregate and manufacturing
GDP has been high and rising, till the recent recession.
According to China's Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM),
foreign invested enterprises, which were responsible
for over half of China's exports, accounted for 30
per cent of the country's industrial output. This
dominance increases in the case of high technology
exports. According to one estimate, as much as 40
per cent of exports from foreign invested enterprises
consist of high technology goods. If that be true,
as much as 70 per cent of the $377 billion worth of
hitech goods exported by China in 2009 was produced
by the FIEs. China, therefore, may be engaged in the
production of a diverse range of manufactured goods,
but the knowledge required for that production is
in substantial measure controlled by firms originating
in the US.
To boot, licensing the use of this knowledge delivers
significant revenues to firms from the USA, far exceeding
that received by other countries. What is noteworthy
is that both receipts and payments of royalties in
the case of the US are in transactions with affiliated
firms. That is, the US is reaping the benefits of
its control over knowledge through transactions conducted
with affiliates abroad. It continues to be a net exporter
of manufacturing technological know-how sold as intellectual
property.
Underlining this becomes important because of the
remarkable performance of China in terms of the relative
share of the high technology sectors in its manufacturing
sector. In the world as a whole that ratio rose from
11.66 per cent in 1985 to 19.08 per cent in 2005.
The EU's performance tracked this trend well, with
the relevant share rising in its case from 9.66 to
14.26 per cent. The US performed better, with the
share in its case rising from 13.7 to 24.2 per cent.
But it was China's performance that was remarkable,
with the hi-tech share in its case rising from 8.4
to 29.4 per cent of manufacturing value added over
this 20 year period.
Even over this long period, China's rise in the global
league tables for hi-tech manufacturing was the result
of a rapid expansion of exports. The ratio of export
sales to revenues rose from 25 per cent in 1985 to
more than 75 per cent in the mid-1990s, only to moderate
later as domestic consumption of high technology products
rose along with incomes. By 2005 that ratio had fallen
below 60 per cent, because of a rise in domestic consumption
and not because of a decline in exports. Even if led
by US transnationals, it delivers foreign exchange
revenues to the Chinese economy.
It is this export success that leads to the visible
fear of China outside its borders. Exports of goods
and services were estimated at close to two fifths
of GDP before the 2008 crisis broke. But that figure
has come down since and is likely remain low as China
seeks to redirect growth and rely more on home demand.
Yet the fear of the emerging giant is unlikely to
subside. This is because its low per capita income
and large population makes its rise more ominous in
the eyes of its global rivals. Being low on the per
capita league table allows China to aspire to high
growth rates for decades to come. When growth occurs
at that level of per capita income, the demand it
generates tend to be more intensive in manufactures,
energy, and mineral resources. Add to this the fact
that the size of the population that will benefit
from that potential growth is immense and the pressure
this puts on the world's resources, besides its environment,
is likely to be huge. The threat that this poses to
countries that rose to dominance in a context of cheap
and ample resources and raw materials should be obvious.
However, as of now they are likely to put a brave
face on, declaring that China's success is not China's
but that of the United States.
April
11, 2011.
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