The
new development economics – and, more generally, the
neo-liberal approach to economics – is based on certain
ideas about markets and private property, in particular
the idea that when property rights are secure and
markets are allowed to function economic growth will
be the salutary result. The condition that "markets
are allowed to function" includes international
markets, and an advocacy of free trade is certainly
one of the hallmarks of the new development economics.
Property rights and effective markets carry the corollary
need for "good governance," a state that,
without excessive corruption, protects property, enforces
contracts, provides the infrastructure – including
the financial infrastructure – for commerce, and,
of course, assures "law and order." Other
things help: for example, a favorable endowment of
natural resources such as good land, water, essential
mineral deposits, and a favorable location for international
commerce. It is, however, the institutions that are
central: markets, property rights, and good governance.
While many rationales and an extensive stock of empirical
studies are offered in support of the new development
economics, perhaps the most important supporting argument
is a particular historical story, an answer to the
question: How did the West get rich while the rest
of the world remained poor? An answer to this question
provides a foundation for the answer to the next question:
What should the rest of the world do to become rich
like the West?
The West got rich, so the story goes, because it developed
secure property rights, markets, and good governance.
There are other parts to the story. In some versions,
the proper attitude towards science and a high level
of literacy are important components, and Weber's
"spirit of capitalism" and "the Protestant
ethic" are sometimes included. Even before Europe
emerged to economically lead – and dominate – the
rest of the world, its advantages are alleged to have
been evident (at least with hindsight): more capital
stock, slightly higher incomes, smaller families,
slightly greater life expectancy, and a more equal
distribution of income. The basic idea is that the
West – most especially Britain, but also other parts
of Northwestern Europe and then the United States
– had these institutions and characteristics while
the rest of the world did not. China and India, for
example, had ancient civilizations and had developed
various technologies far in advance of the West. According
to the story, however, they failed to develop effective
markets, secure property rights, and good governance.
So the West moved ahead.
But what if the story is wrong? What if, for example,
other parts of the world had very similar institutions
to those that the West had – the markets, the property
rights, the good governance, and even "the spirit
of capitalism," and what if the claims about
income levels, life spans, capital stock, and income
distribution in the pre-modern era are incorrect,
but sometime around the end of the 18th century, the
West moved ahead anyway? If this were so, then it
would suggest not that markets and all that were irrelevant,
not even that they were not an important part of the
conditions for economic expansion. It would, however,
suggest that something else was involved, that the
market nexus was not sufficient and does not lie at
the center of the story of economic success. It would
also suggest that one of the pillars on which the
new development economics has been constructed is
imaginary.
It turns out that the Eurocentric foundation of the
new development economics has in fact been subjected
to increasing challenge in recent years. Yet it seems
that little has been done to connect this challenge
to the historical story with a critique of the new
development economics. That is what I would like to
do here.
There are various versions of this challenge, but
one that I have found especially effective and stimulating
is Kenneth Pomeranz's The Great Divergence: China,
Europe, and the Making of the Modern World. Pomeranz
subjects the Eurocentric view to a detailed refutation
and provides, primarily by way of comparison with
China, a convincing argument that Europe cannot be
viewed as "special" in the pre-modern era
in ways that might have laid the foundation for the
"great divergence" that took place around
the end of the 18th century.
One of the bases of Pomeranz's critique of the traditional
Europe-China comparison – or, worse yet, the traditional
Britain-China comparison – is that the geographic
units of comparison are inappropriate. If, for example,
conditions in Western Europe are compared with those
in the Yangzi delta, the results are different than
if the units of comparison are Britain and all of
China. Pomeranz's critique is also based on a rejection
of using Europe as the norm and European economic
organization as the context in which other regions'
activities are evaluated. And he brings to the issue
a more thorough consideration of the data than is
typical of various Eurocentric arguments; especially
important is his consideration of sources of data
for China and his use of recent studies in particular.
These comparisons lead Pomeranz to reject a series
of "facts" about the differences between
Europe and Asia (or parts of Asia) in the pre-modern
era. For example, Pomeranz presents data showing that
in various regions of Asia life expectancy in the
pre-modern era was as great as that in England and
elsewhere in Europe. Likewise, Asians seem to have
limited family size (enhancing accumulation) as did
Europeans, though in different ways. Pomeranz also
argues that, in spite of Europeans' greater stock
of domesticated animals, there is little reason to
believe that they had a greater capital stock overall
than did their counterparts in various parts of Asia.
Moreover, within the Chinese rice-growing context,
there was much less need for animal power than in
the European wheat-growing context; so what was advantageous
by the European norm was not so important in China.
More important than these "simple" matters
of fact, however, Pomeranz also disputes a whole set
of Eurocentric ideas about the difference between
the institutional conditions in Europe and those in
Asia – again, particularly China. According to Pomeranz,
labor markets and land markets were well developed
in large regions of pre-modern China, at least by
comparison to Europe. Also, markets in commodities
and consumption patterns do not seem to have been
more advantageous to long run economic growth in Europe
as compared to Asia. Pomeranz does not claim that
the different regions of the world that he examines
were equivalent in all of these respects, and he does
allow that in some important ways Europe – or parts
of Europe – had distinct advantages. These advantages,
however, were not sufficient to explain the later
divergence.
But if Europe was not "special" in the pre-modern
era, what accounts for the "great divergence"?
No one disputes that sometime around the end of the
18th century Europe (and its offshoots, especially
the United States) began to pull away from the rest
of the world in term of per capita income, so that
by the 20th century there was a huge gap between incomes
in Europe and those in most of the rest of the world.
If we cannot identify the origin of this divergence
in something special about Europe, what is the origin?
The alternative to European special-ness is one of
two stories or, as is the case with Pomeranz's own
explanation, some combination of those two stories.
One of these alternative explanations is that Europe's
relation with the Americas was at the foundation of
its relative success. The other explanation is that
the relative success was a consequence of lucky circumstances.
Europe's relation with the Americas is especially
significant because, insofar as it is important in
explaining the rise of the West, it means that the
economic success of Europe and the United States was
to a large degree based on coercion, the very violent
treatment of non-European peoples in both the Americas
and Africa. Perhaps the alternative story most damning
– to Europeans' sense of satisfaction with their position
in the world – is the Eric Williams thesis. The Williams
thesis is that it was slavery – both the slave trade
and production based on slavery in the West Indies
– that provided a surplus crucial to the foundation
of the industrial revolution in Britain.
Pomeranz neither accepts nor rejects the Williams
thesis, but instead says that the evidence is insufficient
to draw a clear conclusion regarding the quantitative
role of slavery in financing the industrial revolution.
I find Pomeranz's rejection of the Williams thesis
less than convincing, especially as he makes no mention
of the studies which provide the best support for
it in recent decades. My reading of these studies
leads me to view the Williams thesis more favorably,
especially when stated in its weak form – that slavery
played an important role in providing the financing
of Britain's industrial expansion in the 18th century
– rather than its strong form – that slavery is the
explanation for that industrial expansion.
Pomeranz, however, ignores neither the enslavement
of Africans nor the destruction by epidemics and the
violence done to the peoples of the Americas. He certainly
recognizes that coercion and violence were foundations
of Europe's overseas activities. But for him the particular
way in which the Americas contributed to the great
divergence of Europe from the rest of world was different
than in the Williams thesis. Pomeranz argues that
connection to and control of the Americas gave Europe,
especially Britain, the capacity to overcome environmental
constraints that had previously limited the economic
growth of Europe, that were continuing to limit economic
expansion in much of Asia, and that would have continued
to constrain growth in Europe. Without the fuel, food,
fiber and building materials from the Americas, Pomeranz
argues, it would have been extremely unlikely that
Britain and Europe generally would have been able
to continue on a strong upward growth trajectory into
the 19th century. Without that growth, the important
technological innovations of the 19th century would
have been unlikely. The great divergence itself would
probably not have taken place.
In Pomeranz's story, it was not the Americas alone
that led to the rise of the West. In addition, he
argues that coal played an important role. Of course
China had coal too. However, British coal, and later
continental coal, was located close to industrial
and urban centers, allowing its full exploitation
and the interaction of that exploitation with other
aspects of industrial advance, while Chinese coal
was located far from the centers of Chinese progress
(the Yangzi delta). Moreover, particular features
of British coal sites gave additional impetus to its
important role in the industrial success of the country.
So the location and particular nature of coal deposits
provide the lucky parts of Pomeranz's story.
Even if one accepts this alternative story of the
great divergence – or, for that matter, another alternative
story such as that embodied in the Eric Williams thesis
– the markets story of European success does not necessarily
become irrelevant. One could easily argue that without
an effective market nexus (including property rights
and good governance), slavery, the exploitation of
the Americas, and coal would not have had the same
implications for economic change. These alternative
stories do, however, imply that the market nexus itself
was not a sufficient base for economic progress. Had
these sorts of conditions been sufficient, then we
would have seen continued economic expansion in China
– at least in the Yangzi delta – after 1750, and there
would have been no great divergence. Thus the historical
experience suggest that the market argument of the
new economic development – getting the prices right,
as it is often presented – is not a meaningful prescription
for economic success.
More than that. The alternative stories of the great
divergence have in them a much greater role for state
action, for state support of economic change. A good
part of that economic support came in the form of
coercion, the role of colonial powers sponsoring the
slave trade and in controlling the economies of the
so-called periphery. In the alternative stories, whether
directly by slavery or through a more complicated
process, resources were transferred to the industrial
centers and provided essential foundation for economic
progress in those centers. Also, the alternative stories
contain a significant role for luck.
What guidance do alternative stories of the great
divergence then provide for low income countries today
and for development economics? One part of the guidance
is the negative point that I have already noted: the
stories indicate that, contrary to the new development
economics, the market nexus in itself is not likely
to yield continuing progress. On the positive side,
they suggest that if markets are to yield the favorable
growth consequences that they did in Europe, they
are not likely to do so without extensive state support
– support far beyond the good governance prescription.
Such guidance, of course, is in direct contradiction
to the axioms of the new development economics.
The alternative stories also provide us with some
lessons about international commerce. They are positive
lessons, indicating that foreign commerce can play
important, perhaps essential, roles in a country's
or a region's economic progress. They are not, however,
lessons that prescribe "free trade." The
experience as set out in the alternative stories suggests
that state promotion and protection of particular
kinds of foreign commerce can play a major role in
furthering economic growth.
Of course one could also take the lesson from these
alternative stories that the road to economic progress
depends upon coercion, to say nothing of luck. However,
coercion – at least the explicit coercion of peoples
in other regions – is not an acceptable policy prescription,
and luck cannot be prescribed. Still, there are lessons
to be learned from the European dependence on coercion
and luck. One broad lesson is that the international
context is likely to play a very important role in
any country's economic progress. As Europe relied
on foreign resources, it is probably the case that
for other country's to progress economically resources
from outside are important if not essential. Certainly,
the kind of resource extraction from low income countries
that characterizes the current era cannot be a foundation
for progress.
Once we recognize the importance of the international
context, then it should become immediately apparent
that there are no direct lessons from historical stories
– from either the standard neo-liberal stories or
the alternatives. If we allow that the international
context of the pre-modern era was a crucial context
for the divergence of Europe from the rest of the
world, then is should be obvious that the rest of
the world cannot do things the same way. For Europe's
divergence irrevocably altered the international context.
With a dramatically altered international context,
the European option – however we describe it – is
not available. We cannot step in the same river twice.
Thus it is a crucial part of the foundation of the
new development economics not only that it present
its highly contested view of world history, but within
its historical story that the international context
be given a relatively minor role. Because "we
cannot step in the same river twice" and because
the new development economics would prescribe the
European experience as a model for current-day development,
international relations cannot be at the center of
the story. Instead we have: the nations of the "West"
did it on their own, and so the low-income countries
of today should be able to do it on their own as well.
While I believe that the international context was
in fact very important for Europe's success, I do
not believe that a similar international context can
be created today. There are those – for example people
who have lined up behind the UN Millennium Goals –
who seem to think that large amounts of foreign aid
could provide the low-income countries of today with
the international context they need to succeed. Both
the history of foreign aid and the current political
climate in high-income countries (especially the United
States) make one rather skeptical of the success of
this approach. There may be some ways in which governments
of low-income countries, banding together, could affect
the international context. Recent challenges to the
rich countries' program for international agreements,
challenges coming from both the governments of low-income
countries and popular movements, give some credence
to this option. Skepticism notwithstanding, there
is every reason to continue to emphasize the rich
countries' obligation to provide foreign aid; and
certainly the challenges to the rich countries' programs
should be supported.
It is, however, not simply the international context
that is important for a country's economic development,
but also the relationship of a country's economy to
that international context. With limited control over
the context, perhaps the focus should be on the relationship.
Virtually all economic development success – whether
that of the great divergence or more modern experiences,
for example, in East Asia – supports the observation
that state intervention in a country's foreign commerce
is an essential foundation for economic growth, at
least as essential as the market nexus.
History certainly provides some important lessons
about economic development, but they are not the lessons
that are touted by the new development economics.
History may even provide some lessons about how to
shape economic development so that it is both democratic
and egalitarian. But those are lessons for another
day.
* Arthur MacEwan, Department of Economics,
University of Massachusetts, Boston
arthur.macewan@umb.edu
April 10, 2006. |