Widespread poverty and excessive inequality remain the principal challenges to the legitimacy of the process of globalization that has been underway during the last two decades. Even as economies and governments adjust to afford a larger role for markets and a smaller role for the state in development, the importance of public action to deal with poverty and vulnerability has increased. It was for this reason that the 1995 World Summit for Social Development called upon countries not just to set "time-bound goals and targets" to substantially reduce overall poverty and eradicate extreme poverty, but to implement national anti-poverty plans to achieve these targets.
 
Not surprisingly, as anecdotal evidence of the inequalizing effects of globalization accumulates, a charged academic debate has arisen on the issue of globalization and its impact on world incomes. Neoliberal economists are prone to argue that with the lifting of trade barriers between countries and freer movement of capital across borders due to globalization, there is a tendency towards the narrowing down of cross-country income differentials. Inasmuch as this narrowing or homogeneity is the result of a faster increase in per capita incomes in the poorer countries, and so long as the income inequality in these countries is not worsening, the global decline in income differentials should be accompanied by a decline in the incidence of poverty, as measured by the head-count ratio.
 
Such narrowing is a must in the present context, although differences in ability, in resources and in many other factors—less justifiable or obvious—are likely to remain. Income, which is the most basic indicator of economic well-being, must clearly reflect the apparent advantages of globalization. Open market policies, that are advocated by the Washington Consensus as the route to economic prosperity that delivers benefits to all and specially the poorer nations, must ensure that income disparities across the world, as also within countries, do not increase, and that all human beings are included in the distribution of the gains that arise out of this new system. This is especially necessary since liberalization is being thrust on many who are as yet unwilling to have it. The opposite cannot be justified on moral grounds, and even the most cynical must admit that it poses many practical problems, which include according to some, the creation of conditions that engender terrorism.
 
But whether or not these contentions forwarded by neoliberal economists capture actually the reality of the world today remains to be tested. The question is in the first instance empirical. A number of studies in recent years have examined the trends in inter-country and intra-country inequalities during the years of globalization. As is to be expected, the debate has increasingly given rise to disagreements with regard to the measurement of inequality and poverty, and about cross-country and inter-temporal data comparability and methodology of analysis relating to these. Clarification at this level is a minimal prerequisite to establish causal links between and test statistically the relation between income inequality and globalization.
 
What kind of income inequalities are we talking about and what impact does globalization have on these? Inequality is multidimensional and we must study and treat each aspect in detail. 
 
Intra-Country Inequality
The first and most basic concept of inequality that we are familiar with is within-country or intra-country inequality. It indicates the disparity between the incomes of individuals within a particular country. This kind of inequality has existed for a long time though the degree has varied across countries.
 
In clear evidence against the reduction-in–inequality hypothesis, Cornia and Kiiski (2001) found that over the last two decades, inequality has risen in 48 out of the 73 countries that they found high-quality data for. These countries accounted for 73 per cent of the total GDP and 59 per cent of the total population of the 73 countries put together. Of the rest, 16 countries experienced constant and 9, decreasing inequality. At a regional level, the African economies faced rising inequalities, Latin America saw declining inequalities of the 1970s reverse into a rise, while Russia and the Eastern European transition economies experienced a collapse of the middle class that made inequality soar. China experienced rising inequality, especially between its urban coastal areas and the rural interiors. Even the developed countries experienced rising inequality as a result of 'greater disparities in market income', the effect of which has been compounded recently by changes in the tax system, public services and income transfers.
 
A noteworthy feature of this study is that it records adverse trends in income distribution not just for poorly performing economies, as in Latin America during the "lost decade" of the 1980s, but also for economies that experienced remarkable growth after liberalization, as was true of China. Thus, even when liberalisation was followed by growth, the benefits of that growth did not seem to accrue in full measure to the poorer sections of the population. In fact, in a World Bank paper, Lundberg and Squire (1999) found a negative correlation between greater openness to trade and income growth among the poorest 40 per cent of the population, but a strong and positive correlation with income growth among the remaining groups. This was for a sample of 38 countries between 1965 and 1992. Hence it seems that the adjustment costs of greater openness are borne exclusively by the poor, regardless of how long the adjustment takes.
 
However, in a paper entitled, 'Growth is Good for the Poor', World Bank economists David Dollar and Art Kraay (2000a) found a positive relation between the incomes of the bottom fifth of the population and per capita GDP that holds in a sample of 80 countries covering four decades. On the other hand, they did not find any significant impact of openness to trade, measured as exports plus imports as a share of GDP, on poverty. They argued that this shows that globalization or openness had no adverse impact on incomes of the poor. However, globalization, given its promises, must do better than that.
 
This result stands directly opposed to the Lundberg and Squire result. The question, therefore, remained unanswered, forcing attention on the nature of the sample used by the two sets of authors and on issues such as the correctness of the "trade openness" measure used by Dollar and Kraay. Apart from this, a major problem with the Dollar and Kraay study is that, given the collapse of the large middle class in Russia and the East European countries which has increased the extent of income inequality, taking into account only the income of the bottom 20 per cent of the population leaves out a significant section from the income inequality scenario.
 
Many studies have found results showing increased intra-country inequalities during the era of globalization, and interestingly, some such results have come precisely from studies that otherwise show, or attempt to show that overall global inequalities have actually declined over this period.
 
In one such attempt, Xavier Sala-i-Martin, in a recent discussion paper (2002) of Columbia University, measured inequalities both within and across countries. He found that within-country inequalities have increased over the last two decades, and that this is more so when differences in incomes within quintiles of population are included in the analysis. This has mainly been driven by income inequalities in China. The thrust of his argument is that the larger part of global income inequalities is explained by inter-country inequalities and these have actually come down over this period. But his paper does show that as far as within-country inequalities are concerned, the results run contrary to the propositions forwarded by the neoliberal school. Similar results are also found in Quah (2001).
 
In a paper by Weller and Hersh (2002), the authors analyse the short-term and long-run effects of global liberalisation on the poor in developing economies. The results indicate that more current and capital account liberalization hurt the poor. "This is not because trade is directly harmful for the poor, but because of the institutional design under which trade is conducted. In particular, trade in a more deregulated environment lowers the income share of the poor, whereas trade in a more regulated environment raises the share of the poor." As far as income growth is concerned, the results indicate that global deregulation has no measurable, robust impact on growth rates. Therefore, the short-term effects on the income share of the poor are not offset by significant faster income growth in the long-run.
 
In addition their results also indicate that trade and possibly capital flows may have a beneficial effect on growth in the long-run, and no systematic adverse effect on the income share of the poor in a regulated environment. To quote, "hence, greater trade and capital mobility in a regulated environment, as was the case for the majority of countries for most of the sample period, appears to be a preferable development choice". However, the authors point towards the need for detailed research to find out the exact nature of regulations that can help reap maximum benefits from trade and capital flows and simultaneously let the poor share in these gains.
 
Inter-Country Inequality
Inter-country inequalities accounting for a large part of world inequality is a result derived also by Milanovic (2001). He shows that rising income inequality in the world is mainly due to between-country or inter-country (or cross-country) inequality (75 to 88 per cent) and not within-country inequality. Let us move onto a more detailed discussion of such inequality.
 
Inter-country inequality refers to the disparities in average or per capita incomes between countries. Analytical treatment of this kind of inequality involves an inherent assumption that all individuals within a particular country earn close to that average income i.e. within-country inequalities are not taken into account. With the dilution of economic borders between countries, the question of inter-country disparities has been in the forefront of discussions recently. Inequalities between nations, although present for a long time, show up as being lower the further we go back in time.
 
Economic historian Angus Maddison (2001), on the basis of GDP per capita, has estimated that the richest countries were about three times richer than the poorest countries in 1820. This difference has grown over time. However, in today's age of increasing integration of the world economy with the intention that countries should jointly share benefits, further increases in inequalities between nations can have no possible justification.

But sadly, as Marc Lee (2002) points out, "the UN's Human Development Report (1999) adds that in 1960, the top 20 per cent of the world's people in the richest countries had 30 times the income (in terms of total GDP) of the poorest 20 per cent. This grew to 32 times in 1970, to 45 times in 1980, and to 59 times in 1989. By 1997, the top 20 per cent received 74 times the income of the bottom 20 per cent." This would seem to imply that the globalized world we are living in today has seen a dramatic rise in inequality.
 
The attempt to show that policies of globalization have been accompanied by decreasing poverty and income inequalities is contained in a report by Dollar and Kraay (2000b). They identify the globalized nations on the basis of two variables, namely, increased trade to GDP ratio and reduced tariff barriers. Their finding is that the globalizers have overtaken the non-globalizers in terms of their joint GDP growth rates. Apart from serious problems of bias in the selection of sample countries in each variable category and the measures of openness used, e.g. measure of trade volume rather than trade policy, as pointed out by Dani Rodrik (2000), the study has certain other major drawbacks.
 
First, the inclusion of India and China as globalizers does pose a major problem since both countries are known for their reluctance and sluggishness in adopting the new policies prescribed by the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO. This is true also of many other economies included in the 'globalizer' category, for example, Malaysia, Thailand and Brazil, many of which have followed limited forms of globalization. On the other hand, many of their 'non-globalizers' in Latin America and Africa display remarkably open trade and structural adjustment policies as prescribed by the IMF and the World Bank.
 
Second, since India and China have huge populations that jointly account for a third of the world total, the weighting of country GDP estimates by population results in an upward bias of growth rates of the so-called globalized nations, as India and China have both had high GDP growth rates in the recent decades.
 
Another argument on lines similar to that of Dollar and Kraay has been advanced by Martin Wolf, in an article in the Financial Times (2000). He argues that China's growth, which has been a major factor responsible for the reduction of cross-country inequalities, has been driven by the increased opening up of its economy. He also argues that many of the backward countries have remained backward because they have not opened up enough. Again, the same criticism holds.
 
In another set of results favouring the advocates of globalization, Sala-i-Martin (2002), using a number of measures including the Gini coefficient and the Theil Index, has found that cross-country inequalities have came down during the period 1978-98. His argument is that the growth of incomes in China, and to a lesser extent in India, contributed largely to the reduction in inequality. On the other hand, the African economies have shown a huge disparity in incomes as compared to the developed nations, and if their incomes remain stagnant then world inequality will rise again in the future. We discuss his finding in more detail in later.
 
Branko Milanovic, in a 1999 World Bank research paper that starkly contradicts the above results, found that the Gini coefficient measuring across-country inequalities based on per capita GDP actually rose from 55 to 58 between 1988 and 1993. His use of population weighted per capita GDP figures as opposed to the per capita country GDP figures used previously, yielded results that showed a decline in income inequality. This latter result can easily be explained by high GDP growth rates in the hugely populated countries of China and India. Dropping China from the sample threw up a constant inequality, and dropping India in addition, again showed an increasing Gini for between-country inequality.
 
World Inequality
Combining the concepts of intra-country and inter-country inequalities give us a definition of global or world inequality, which calculates income disparities between individuals as if they belonged to the same nation. This is calculated as a distribution of total world incomes among the total population of the world. Study of such inequalities has emerged recently, and has concentrated on developing different measures of calculation.
 
Sala-i-Martin's 2002 paper finds that global income inequality has closely followed the pattern of inter-country inequalities and come down over the two decades, since 1978. In addition, worldwide poverty numbers have gone down sharply, signifying an increase in the economic well-being of the poor.
 
Milanovic (1999), on the other hand, finds that the world or global Gini coefficient, which takes into account both inter-country and intra-country inequalities, increased from 63 in 1988 to 66 in 1993. If purchasing power differences are not taken into account, i.e. if one looks at the differences in simple dollar incomes, the world Gini increased from 78 to 80. In a later study (2001), Milanovic confirms the above results using both the Gini and the Theil index. He cites three reasons for this growth in inequality. The first is the slow growth of incomes, especially rural, in Asian countries relative to OECD countries. The second is the pulling ahead of urban China relative to rural China and India. The third is the 'hollowing out' of the middle class in Eastern Europe.
 
In a study from the London School of Economics by Robert H. Wade ('Is globalization making world income distribution more equal?', May 2001), similar factors have been cited as the cause for the rise in global and between-country inequalities. Rapidly widening income distribution within the biggest countries (India and China) has also been a major contributory factor. While the gap, worldwide, between the average income of the top quintile of people (top 20 per cent) and the average income of the bottom quintile within each country is about 5:1, the gap between the average income of the top quintile of states and that of the bottom quintile is of the order of 25-30:1.The report takes the World Bank and the IMF to task for their failure to use their formidable research capacities to look at the trends and causes of world income distribution. Wade also points to "the need to remember that East Asian states achieved economic success by creating national economic space (partially separate from the world economy) and setting conditions on the entry of foreign capital" and that "China's current dirigiste strategy, similar to that of pre-liberalization Japan and South Korea, is more likely to succeed than the World Bank's model".
 
If we look at asset distribution across the world, financial assets held by 7.2 million individuals in the top income group were valued at US$27 trillion in 2000, almost as high as the world 's total GDP ($31 trillion in 2000). The assets of the top 200 richest people amount to more than the combined income of 41 per cent of the world's population. However, detailed analysis of wealth distribution, which is definitely an important indicator of economic well-being, has been lacking.
 
Globalization, China and India
Throughout the debate on income inequality in the globalized world of today, China and, to a lesser extent India, emerge as key movers of the results. Some interesting points emerge from a closer analysis of their roles.

World Inequality, Globalization, China and India
Robert. J. Barro, in a recent article,  cites the Sala-i-Martin results to argue that inequality has decreased in the globalization era. He states that the 1999 UN human Development Report, 'should base their assessments of world poverty and inequality on a better understanding of the facts'. Two points need to be noted here.
 
First, when China is dropped from the sample, Sala-i-Martin's Mean Logarithmic Deviation index (the only one he reports) shows a relatively flat pattern with no consistent increase but no clear decline either. In Milanovic's analysis, dropping China and India seem to re-establish the rising inequality scenario. Second, as pointed out earlier, China and India, on whose performance the Sala-i-Martin results are heavily dependent, cannot be taken as model examples of globalizers whereas many of the African countries have actually opened up much more. So while these two countries are doing well, it is not because they are relatively more globalized than the countries which are doing badly. In another example of such misused definitions, Dollar and Kraay (2000b) take China and India as globalized and more open, and find the growth rates of globalized nations as a whole to be higher. As argued earlier, this classification cannot be acceptable to the discerning economist.
 
That including China and India as examples of successful globalizers is a conceptual mistake, has also been pointed out by Wade (2001) and Rodrik (2000). In the words of the latter: "the main trade reforms followed a decade after the onset of higher growth" in these two countries. In the Chinese case, "the increase in growth started in the late 1970s with the introduction of the household responsibility system in agriculture and of two-tier pricing", whereas the trade reforms did not begin till the second half of the eighties. As for India, its growth rate increased substantially during the 1980s, whereas serious trade reforms were not in place before 1991-93. The tariff averages displayed in the chart show that tariffs were actually higher in the rising growth period of the 1980s than in the low-growth period of the 1970s. Rodrik further argues that the fact that China and India participated in foreign trade does not mean that their growth followed increased foreign trade. One needs to look at proper sequencing of events here.

Income Inequality within China and India
In the literature (D. Quah, Cornia and Kiiski, Sala-i-Martin, Milanovic, Wade), there is ample evidence of rising income inequalities within China and India, as also in many other countries including some in the developed world. Most studies find that rising global inequalities stem from differences in income growth between the urban and rural sectors in both India and China, though this has coincided with rises in overall income per capita. Milanovic and Wade have both identified this as one of the major factors explaining rising international income inequality. Even with a reduction in absolute poverty, rising income inequalities between sectors, and rising or even constant income inequalities in general should still be a matter of concern.
 
So the argument that if one-third of the world's population is apparently doing well, it indicates that the world is also doing well (Sala-i-Martin), is compelling but not conclusive. Firstly, not all of that one third may be doing that well. Secondly, the rest of the world, especially the African countries, the erstwhile USSR and the East European countries are doing much worse and that has to be a matter of great concern. As pointed out by Barro and Sala-i-Martin themselves, stagnancy in African incomes may be a major cause for a future rise in world income inequality. As poverty estimates show, the largest number of the world's poor are now in Africa. Two countries, which happen to have large populations, cannot change the reality of the huge disparities that exist between a few rich countries and numerous small, backward ones.
 
The Three Concepts of Inequality
While it is useful to measure and analyse all three concepts of inequality, for the individual in a particular country it is the concept of within-country inequality that is the most relevant. And in that regard, the world is definitely worse off today.
 
With the increasing integration of economies, it is perhaps also pertinent to ask what is happening to the inequalities between countries, which It are supposed to be the major source of world income inequalities.
 
The first problem in undertaking this kind of analysis is conceptual. The fact is that individuals within a country do not earn the average per capita income by which the country is represented on the world income distribution map. Wide disparities within the country can render such representation meaningless. And most studies have proved that this is so.
 
The second problem remains that of data. All studies focusing on this issue must resort to empirical evidence. However, it is very difficult to construct data-sets across countries that are consistent, clean and comparable.

• Disaggregated household-level income and consumption data for a long enough time period are hard to get even for a single country. Most countries do not conduct intensive surveys at the levels required for such analyses. India's National Sample Survey (NSS) data is one among a few examples of systematic and detailed data that can be used for such purposes. This poses a problem for measuring intra-country inequalities too, but is much more acute in the case of inter-country analysis.
  
• Even detailed sources of data, like the NSS, are now being contaminated and tampered with in order to arrive at the 'desirable' results. A major problem here is that conducting wide and intensive surveys to get the required data is very expensive and can be pursued by very few agencies, sometimes not even by the government of a country. If the few that do have the resources have their own agenda to push in this regard, then one cannot but question the veracity of such data. Recent history tells us that such fears are very real today.
  
• Unless data-sets can be kept robust across countries, the error margin for a study involving a large number of countries would be huge. From base-level information (if available), such data are generally estimated first at the district level, followed by the state/province, national and finally the international level. At each step, these estimations involve a lot of assumptions, many of which can also be biased. Most studies, including that used by Milanovic and Sala-i-Martin, involve wide extrapolations and interpolations that puts into question the veracity of the final data-set that is constructed.
  
• Comparing data-sets that specifically relate to individual countries raises another major problem. Despite using the notion of purchasing power parity, such comparisons are very difficult. And, as discussed later, the World Bank standards of purchasing power equivalence, which are commonly used in such studies, have problems in themselves.
  
• The concept of world inequality is an attempt at resolving the first kind of problem with between-country inequalities. This is supposed to take into account both the first two concepts of inequality. However, though an interesting analytical concept, it has limited relevance in reality. The phenomenon of globalization notwithstanding, individuals in the present day do not function as members of a single economic community. They exist under varying economic and political regimes. Therefore, to cite their economic positions and income ranking as if they did live in a homogeneous society does not say much about the actual state of the world. Even if world inequality were down, would it really mean that the poor in Africa were better off? Arguably not. Also, as we have seen, the measurement of world inequality can get biased by the presence of a few large nations. Again, studies like those by Milanovic and Sala-i-Martin take inter-country inequality as a higher contributor while calculating overall world inequality. This, apart from being fraught with the data problems discussed above, is of limited relevance for a specific country. Even if world inequality is shown to be declining, driven in large part by higher average per capita incomes in China and India compared to other countries (the between-country factor), it does not really mean that the poorer people in China are better off unless inequalities within China are also declining. Ultimately, therefore, it is within-country inequality that we need to take into account.
   
  Two more issues need to be addressed before concluding our discussion.
  
  Economic Growth, Globalization and Income
  The first concerns the role of overall economic growth in increasing incomes of the poor and income inequality. Economic growth by itself cannot be a measure of proportionately increasing incomes and well-being, if there is a simultaneous rise of income inequality within the country. Martin Wolf's (2000) argument is an example of this kind of serious misconception.
   
  Many scholars, Dollar and Kraay (2000a) and D. Quah (2002) for example, have tested a relation between overall growth of an economy and poverty reduction. Quah, in a major study on China and India, finds rising and constant income inequality, respectively, in the two countries (over a period of rising growth in per capita incomes). But his argument is based on poverty numbers. He argues that growth definitely led to a decrease in poor people in absolute terms in both countries. The Gini coefficient would have had to rise phenomenally to compensate for this fall in poverty numbers, of which there is no evidence. So there is an overall fall in poverty resulting from growth. Dollar and Kraay (2000a) found a similar positive relation between growth and mean income of the poor (as discussed earlier). But they did not find that growth had any impact on the distribution of income. Weller and Hersh have also tested the impact of economic liberalisation on growth and as mentioned earlier, the results indicate that global deregulation has no measurable, robust impact on growth rates. At the same time, in a regulated environment, trade and possibly capital flows may actually have a beneficial effect on growth in the long-run. On the basis of this, the authors argue for more trade and capital flows in a regulated environment.
   
  There are many questions that arise here. First, even if growth leads to reduction of poverty, increasing within-country inequality may lead to a less-than-proportionate distribution of this growth across different segments of the population. The increasing rural-urban income gap in China and India is an indicator of this fact. Second, even if growth does lead to reduction of overall poverty, the crucial question is, 'does globalization lead to growth?' This crucial link has not been tested by Dollar and Kraay, but simply assumed. The growth argument is not enough if globalization is advanced as an explanation of poverty reduction (though not by Quah). Again, as mentioned earlier, Kraay and Dollar find no significant impact of globalization on poverty reduction.
   
  Measurement Errors in World Bank Estimates
  The second issue involves possible errors in measurement methods that might have contaminated all measures of inequality and poverty which are routinely used by economists in measuring disparities in these variables.
   
  For example, in a recent paper, Sanjay G. Reddy and Thomas W. Pogge argue that "the estimates of the extent, distribution and trend of global income poverty provided in the World Bank's World Development Reports for 1990 and 2000/01 are neither meaningful nor reliable." First, the Bank uses an arbitrary international poverty line unrelated to any clear conception of what poverty is, and one that will allow identification of the commodities that must be commanded in order to avoid being poor. Second, it employs a misleading and inaccurate measure of purchasing power "equivalence" that creates serious and irreparable difficulties for international and inter-temporal comparisons of income poverty. Finally, it extrapolates incorrectly from limited data and thereby creates an appearance of precision that masks the high probable error of its estimates. "The systematic distortion introduced by these three flaws likely leads to a large understatement of the extent of global income poverty and to the false appearance that it is falling." Since poverty estimates are widely quoted to contradict or support income-inequality effect arguments (D. Quah, Robert J. Barro, Sala-i-Martin, Dollar and Kraay, Martin Wolf), it has a great relevance for the latter and for the study of the impact of globalization on global income movements.
   
  Conclusion
  It is undeniable that the world needs more studies testing the links between specific aspects of globalization and income inequality. From the available analyses, the following points emerge. The movement of a few large, high-growth, developing countries like China and India may sometimes throw up statistics showing that world inequality has fallen, but given the evidence of rising income inequality within them and the stark and growing inequalities in a large chunk of the less-developed countries like Africa, Latin America, Russia and East Europe, we cannot be complacent. The latter countries have also experienced rising disparities in average incomes compared to those of the richer developed countries. Rising inequalities have been noted within some developed countries too. Further, globalization cannot be claimed as the definitive factor that has driven growth in countries like China and India. In fact the very opposite may be true. And there are enough examples of African and Latin American countries that have actually been badly damaged after following a more open policy. Finally, there is need for conceptual clarity and intellectual honesty to register and acknowledge facts, and then to prescribe or uphold the necessary policy. This holds for the statistics and data that are generated and published widely, for methods of analysis that are resorted to, and interpretations that need to look at results more critically and sometimes beyond the outer covering.
  
  References
  
• Barro Robert, J. (2002): 'The Bad News on Poverty', The Economic Times, May 12, 2002
• Cornia, Giovanni Andrea and Sampsa Kiiski (2001) "Trends in Income Distribution in the Post-World War II Period: Evidence and Interpretation " WIDER Discussion Paper No..89,Helsinki: United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research.
• Dollar, D. and A. Kraay (2000b): 'Trade, Growth and Poverty', World Bank Research Paper
• Dollar, D. and A. Kraay (2000a): 'Growth is Good for the Poor', World Bank Research Paper.
• Human Development Report (1999): United Nations Development Programme, New York: Oxford University Press
• Lee, Marc. (2002): 'The global Divide: Inequality in the World economy', Behind the Numbers, Economic Facts Figures and Analysis, Vol. 4, No.2, April 18
• Lundberg, M. and L. Squire (1999). 'The simultaneous Evolution of Growth and Inequality', World Bank Research Paper
• Maddison, Angus. (2001): 'The World Economy: A Millenial Perspective'. Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
• Milanovic, B. (1999):'True world income distribution, 1988 and 1993: First calculation based on household surveys alone', World Bank Research Paper
• Milanovic, B. (2001): "World Income Inequality in the Second Half of the 20th Century," World Bank Research Paper, March
• Quah, D. (2002): 'One Third of the World's Growth and Inequality', London School of Economics
• Sanjay G. Reddy and Thomas W. Pogge (2002): 'How not to Count the Poor'.
• Rodrik, Dani. (2000): 'Comments on "Trade, Growth, and Poverty," by D. Dollar and A. Kraay', Harvard University, October
• Sala-i-Martin, X. (2002): The Disturbing "Rise" of Global Income Inequality, Discussion Paper, Department of Economics, Columbia University
• Wade, Robert. H. (2001): 'Is globalisation making world income distribution more equal?', London School of Economics, May
• Weller, C.E and A. Hersh (2002): 'The Long and Short of It: Global Liberalization, Poverty and Inequality'
• Wolf, Martin (2000): 'The Big Lie of Global Inequality', Financial Times, February 8
  
  August 19, 2002.