There
is no doubt that employment generation has emerged
as not only the most important socio-economic issue
in the country today, but also the most pressing political
concern. The mandate of the recent elections is clear
on this: the people of the country have decisively
rejected policies that have implied reduced employment
opportunities and reduced access to and quality of
public goods and services.
Indeed, one of the main reasons for the defeat of
the previous government was the widespread dissastisfaction
with that government's economic policies. The
complete collapse of rural employment generation (which
that government tried to cover up through statistical
jugglery and false, even insulting claims about "India
shining") was a dominant cause of public dissatisfaction.
Chart 1 shows why this should be so. The latter part
of the 1990s witnesses total rural employment (of
all kinds – that is self-employed and wage labour,
principal or subsidiary occupation, full-time or part-time)
growing at the miserable rate of only 0.58 per cent
per year, at a time when the rural population was
growing at around 1.7 per cent per year. Subsequently,
matters have hardly improved, although the lack of
comparable data does not allow us to make meaningful
calculations of the rate of change.
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This was why almost all the political parties that
currently form the ruling United Progressive Alliance,
as well as the Left parties that have extended outside
support, made the issue of employment a major plank
in their electoral campaigns and their manifestos.
And the promise to do something about rural employment
generation in particular was probably one of the most
significant promises that actually resonated with
the electorate.
Therefore, it was only to be expected that the promise
of generating rural employment through public works
programmes would find major expression in the declared
programme of the new government – avoiding it
would have meant a major retraction from all the promises
that have actually won this new government its current
power.
Fortunately, the new government has recognised the
importance of this issue, and the need to do something
to regenerate rural economic activity in particular.
One of the first sections of the Common Minimum Programme
of the UPA government makes the following promise:
"The UPA government will immediately enact a
National Employment Guarantee Act. This will provide
a legal guarantee for at least 100 days of employment
on asset-creating public works programmes every year
at minimum wage for every rural household."
This is not a new idea – the United Front government
in 1991 had floated such a scheme, and it has already
been sought to be implemented in some form by state
governments such as those of Maharashtra over several
decades. However, such a commitment by the central
government is indeed new, firstly because it promises
to make this a legal right of all citizens, and secondly
because the onus of finding the funds for such a programme
(if not the actual implementation) rests squarely
with the central government rather than with the states.
This is a very important commitment, and one that
should be given top priority, if the new government
wants to remain faithful to its mandate. However,
this particular promise is already being excoriated
in the financial press, and by skeptical observers
who find any public outlays that benefit the common
people to be "populist" and undesirable,
even when they wholeheartedly approve of fiscal measures
that end up transferring huge amounts of public assets
and resources to large capital and the already rich.
The main criticism that is being raised against this
programme is that it would simply be too expensive
and therefore impossible for the government to fulfill
this particular promise. All kinds of extravagant
claims are being made about the fiscal outlays that
are required, and the numbers are so inflated as to
make the attempt appear to be impossible.
In this context, it is worth investigating the actual
costs likely to be associated with this programme
in a more realistic way. The first point to bear in
mind is that, while the employment guarantee is a
legal gaurantee provided to every rural household,
quite obviously every such household would not take
up the offer. Employment schemes have the great virtue
of being self-selecting by the poor (and therefore
not requiring targeting) since anyone who can get
income above the minimum wage through any other activity
would not be interested.
Therefore, it is likely that only a proportion of
rural households would choose to avail of the offer
and take up such employment, and even among such households,
not all of them would choose to take up such employment
for the full 100 days that are promised. Given the
prevailing estimates of rural poverty, wage incomes
and occupational structure of the rural population,
the chances are that between one-third to around 40
per cent of all rural households would choose to exercise
this right across the country – which is between
49 to 59 million households.
This does not necessarily mean that only this number
of households would be involved in such a programme;
rather, that the total number of employment days that
would require to be generated would be around that
number, with possibly more households than that participating
but some households taking less days of work from
such programmes.
Now consider the cost per household. This involves
providing 100 days of work to any member of the household
at the minimum wage. The minimum wage varies across
states, but the weighted average can be taken as Rs.
60 per day. Of course the assumption must be that
the wages would be equal for men and women workers
– which is what is legally required but has
not always been followed in employment programmes
thus far. This means that the wage component of the
cost per participating household would be Rs. 6,000
per year.
Assume that wages will account for two-thirds of the
total cost, so that the non-wage component would come
to Rs. 3,000 per year, generating a total cost of
Rs. 9,000 per year per household. The non-wage component
is slightly less than it has been in recent years
in existing employment schemes, but it is argued that
this is easy to achieve especially with decentralised
panchayat-level control over such resources and the
implementation of this programme.
This means that the total cost of such a programme
would probably come to somewhere between Rs. 44,000
crores and Rs. 53,000 crore per year. These calculations
are presented in Table 1.
Table 1 : Estimated cost of employment
guarantee
(Figures in rupees per year)
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Wage cost per household
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Non-wage cost per household
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Total cost per household
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6000
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3000
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9000
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(Figures in millions)
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Total households
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40 per cent of households
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33 per cent of households
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148
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59.2
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49.3
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(Figures in crores per year)
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Total cost with
40 per cent of households
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Total cost with 33 per cent of
households
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53100
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44100
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At first glance this may seem like a large amount for
an annual outlay. However, a number of points have to be
borne in mind in this connection. First, even if such
employment generation yielded no other positive result,
the fact is that increased wage incomes in rural areas
would generate more demand for rural goods and services,
and thus generate positive multiplier effects. In a
condition of major economic slack, such as operates in
the rural economy of India today, this would have large
beneficial implications for material conditions, and
even contribute to increased tax revenues because of
higher levels of economic activity.
Second, it must be remembered that such a programme
does not involve an expenditure of resources for the
sole purpose of creating employment. Rather, the idea is
to use the workers productively in activities which will
build or maintain assets in the countryside, or provide
important social or economic services. So such
expenditure will yield dividends not only in terms of
higher levels of economic activity in the present but
also through improving the conditions of production in
rural areas. There are many such potential activities
which can have important effects on supply conditions,
productivity and sustainability of rural economic
activities, in both agriculture and non-agriculture.
For example, constructing and maintaining roads and
other connectivity (which has thus far been the most
popular form of activity in such schemes) has direct and
indirect effects in agricultural marketing and a whole
range of other economic activities, besides generally
improving the conditions of rural residents. But other
activities, which are often far less captial-intensive,
such as building and maintaining bundhs, minor
irrigation works, clearing out and desilting ponds and
rivers, also have very positive short run and long run
effects on production conditions and can also improve
the sustainability of cultivation patterns generally,
implying important social gains.
But even these do not cover the full range of
possibilities in terms of productive and useful
activities that can be undetaken under such an
employment programme. There is a huge range of social
services that must be performed, which are now
systematically underprovided across rural India. These
include activities such as those performed by workers in
educational and health institutions who provide
maintenance and support, the provision of mid-day meals
in schools, sanitation services, and the like. There is
no question that greater provision of such necessary
public services would greatly improve the quality of
life of rural residents, and also contribute directly
and indirectly to economic growth.
So this amount is really not very much when seen as
part of a broader public investment and development
programme that is particularly focussed on rural
regeneration, which is unquestionably the most urgent
policy focus today. In any case, some Rs. 6100 crores
was already committed to rural employment schemes in the
interim budget, so this involves an additional outlay of
around Rs. 40,000 crores.
Third, consider how this amount compares with other
expenditures made by the central government. Chart 2
provides the interim budget 2004-05 estimates of outlays
on defence, subsidies and rural employment, as well as
the current estimate of additional resource requirement
for employment guarantee. It is evident that the
proposed new outlay is well below the anticipated
defence expenditure, and even below the projected
expenditure on subsidies.
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In any case, this projected amount likely to be spent
on employment guarantee is a trifling percentage of
projected GDP – amounting to only 1.55 per cent of
projected GDP at the coverage of one-third of rural
households and still only 1.86 per cent of GDP at 40 per
cent coverage. This is well below the proposed increased
expenditure of this government on education, and indeed
well below a large range of other less productive
expenditures of the government.
More to the point, it is substantially below the
fiscal effect of the large tax give-aways of the central
government, which over the period since 1980-81, have
caused the central tax-GDP ratio to fall from more than
13 per cent to less than 10 per cent. It is interesting
that the same economists who have supported such huge
transfers to the rich through lower tax collections,
have been the most bitterly opposed to employment
schemes which would not only provide relief to the poor
of the country but also create valuable assets and
provide important social and economic services.
In sum, the employment guarantee scheme has much to
recommend for itself. It costs about as much or far less
than many other lower priority activities, which have in
some cases have been rightly emphasised by this and
previous governments. It can be dealt with in a manner
which simultaneously ensures the realisation of the
pressing need to increase capital formation in rural
India. If properly planned and implmented it can help
deliver much need quality public services in rural
India. By providing incomes to those it need it most it
can help redress an unaceptable feature of the Indian
economy – the persitence of large scale poverty.
Finally, while achieving all this it would result in
increases in output and tax revenues, which helps
finance a part of the expenditure on the scheme. There
can be no better example of a winning initiative.
Therefore, there is no real need to defend it against
those who perversely welcome "dream budgets" with tax
concessions as progressive and market frendly, while
illegitimately dismissing an employment guarantee scheme
that is targeted at increasing capital formation and
productivity in rural India.
July 5, 2004. |