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Redistribution and Stability: Beyond the Keynesian / neo-liberal impasse | |
Harry Shutt | |
As the financial crisis that erupted in
2007 unfolds in an economic cataclysm which, it is now clear, is unprecedented
in the history of capitalism, world leaders without exception reveal themselves
as politically and ideologically bankrupt in their efforts to bring it under
control. This is most obviously demonstrated by their insistence on the
need for individuals and enterprises to boost their levels of consumption
and fixed investment - with the aid of new loans from the financial sector
- even though it is obvious that the immediate cause of the crisis has been
the creation of excessive credit leading people (and businesses) to spend
well beyond their means. The implication of this manifestly perverse official response to the crisis is that the world economic system has become fatally dependent on the need endlessly to expand production (of goods and services) at the fastest possible rate without regard to the ability of the market to absorb them. It is the compulsion to feed this addiction to rapid growth - in the face of long-term decline in the rate of global GDP increase since the 1970s - which has driven the credit bubble (or, as we should rather say, series of bubbles) that has now finally burst with such devastating effect. The logic of this strategy of trying to revive the level of consumption and investment (total final expenditure) at all costs is that it is necessary in order to overcome the shortfall in demand relative to productive capacity (of capital and labour), thereby increasing the rate of capacity utilisation. Clearly, however, the same objective could in principle be achieved by allowing productive capacity to shrink - through the natural process of capital destruction brought about through the classic business cycle. But equally clearly, since this would also mean putting tens of millions of surplus workers into unemployment as well as the obliteration of scores of trillions in market value of financial assets. allowing the cycle to run its course in this way would impose unacceptable economic and social disruption on a global scale. The evidence of the last 30 years points unambiguously to the conclusion that it is not possible to avert such a disaster by artificially boosting demand to fill the ''output gap''. For we have known at least since the 1970s that ''Keynesian'' policies cannot indefinitely stave off or reverse such downturns - and also risk inducing unacceptable levels of inflation - while the three subsequent decades of neo-liberalism have equally failed to stop global growth rates from continuing to slow - despite a massive boost to indebtedness in an increasingly desperate attempt to keep people spending. Now that this strategy has inevitably collapsed in a morass of unpayable debt it is striking that the entire global leadership have nothing to propose but a rerun of the failed Keynesian agenda of yesteryear. Yet they must be aware that the danger of this approach is that levels of public debt (as a proportion of GDP) are already at least twice as high as 30 years ago, limiting the scope for further borrowing or money printing without risking Weimar / Mugabe-style currency collapse. Furthermore such an attempt to revive demand for both capital and labour will be rendered even more futile than in the past by a shift in a) the pattern of demand away from manufactures towards services (which are less capital-intensive) and b) technological change (so that less capital and labour are now needed per unit of output). At the same time other factors (health consciousness, environmental constraints) are tending to limit or even reverse consumption growth. Despite these constraints all governments - and most economists - are seemingly committed to this strategy which is bound to fail. Given this unanimity it seems inevitable for the moment (as of January 2009) that such a strategy will continue to be pursued until it is shown to be unworkable (perhaps by an outbreak of hyperinflation). It is important to prepare for this eventuality and face the reality that we are long past the stage where it is possible to avoid a calamitous contraction in global production by artificial stimulation of demand. At that point it should also become inescapably self-evident that such a contraction is the only way that the crisis of overproduction can be resolved under the capitalist system. Yet since this would be intolerable it follows that
It likewise follows from the preceding analysis of the weaknesses of
the existing capitalist model that maximising GDP growth is no longer
tenable as the supreme public good of economic policy makers - as it has
been at least since World War II. By the same token an economic system
that is dependent on high growth - based largely on profit-maximising
shareholder companies - must be seen as outmoded. In trying to develop
a more functional and sustainable economic model we shall need to return
to first principles.
Little attention has been given to the fact that Ricardo’s own contemporary
Malthus exposed the central theoretical weakness in this model in that
it ultimately rests on the very primitive Say’s Law - ''supply creates
it own demand'' - which underpins Ricardo’s Labour Theory of Value. The
fact that the latter was uncritically adopted by Marx and his followers
is perhaps ascribable to their close identification with another producer
interest - labour - whose leaders may have seen it as conveniently aligned
with their own narrow objective of maximising the numbers employed (potential
union members / political supporters). Although Keynes and his followers
recognised the importance of Malthus’ critique and insight that overproduction
was not only possible but chronically inevitable, they were and are overwhelmingly
supporters of the same producer (capitalist) interests favoured by Ricardo.
Crucially any alternative system must be geared to determining economic
priorities and allocating resources based on criteria other than the highest
rate of ROC (profit maximisation) as determined by the market. This must
imply reaching such decisions based on politically determined selection
- derived in turn from democratic processes defining greatest (social)
need. Once the requirement to maximise returns to shareholders is removed
- along with the bias in favour of the most capital-intensive forms of
fixed investment - it will become apparent that a huge share of economic
value added that is at present wastefully diverted to serving the priorities
of the owners of capital[4] can be more usefully
devoted to serving the needs of the wider public as briefly outlined above.
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© International Development Economics Associates 2009 |