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External Debt Stress and Domestic Debt Restructuring: Resolving a paradox C. P. Chandrasekhar
(Paper presented at the PERI-IDEAs conference on “Debt and Climate Justice”. 3-5 May 2024)
Abstract
The ongoing sovereign debt crisis in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) was signalled by instances of default or failure to meet external debt obligations denominated in hard currencies. But the response to the crisis has included attempts to restructure domestic sovereign debt issued largely in domestic currencies. Such moves have been justified by identifying the crisis as one of excessive aggregate public debt rather than just unsustainable levels of external debt. There is a need, it is argued, to reduce the gross financing needs (foreign and domestic) of debt-stressed governments that have accumulated excessively high levels of aggregate—domestic and foreign currency—public debt.
This assertion ignores the difference between the stress associated with servicing debt in domestic and foreign currency. Governments can mobilise domestic resources using their sovereign right to tax and central banks have control over domestic currency supply, whereas both have little control over foreign currency availability, which depends on net foreign revenues earned and on net inflows of foreign incomes, transfers and capital. While domestic debt restructuring releases domestic resources, it does not automatically yield the foreign currency needed to relieve external debt stress.
In addition, since the holders of domestic sovereign debt include citizens deploying their savings to invest in pension funds, insurance products and mutual funds, and commercial banks parking resources in ‘safe investments’, restructuring that debt through explicit or implicit haircuts is bound to be economically destabilising. Past savings would be eroded with adverse impact on current demand, and the damage to the balance sheets of banks would restrain credit to the detriment of consumption and investment. This makes implementation of domestic debt restructuring costly and difficult, as experience illustrates.
Given that context, the paper examines the possible reasons why when less developed countries face external debt stress, the IMF and global finance insist on domestic debt restructuring as part of conditions associated with provision of emergency balance of payments finance or the restructuring of foreign debt.
This is available as PERI Working Paper 605 at https://peri.umass.edu/?view=
