The
full details of the financial crisis triggered by
subprime lending had just about been absorbed, when
the much-discredited financial system in the developed
countries, especially the US, was hit by another quake.
This was the mid-December revelation that one more
of the venerated Wall Street figures, Bernard Madoff,
and his investment firm, Bernard L. Madoff Investment
Securities LLC, had indulged in fraud on a massive
scale, leading to losses estimated by Madoff himself
at $50 billion.
While the details are still being investigated, reports
suggest that the fraud amounted to a straight-forward
Ponzi scheme in which new capital raised was partly
used to pay-off old investors, so that they could
earn a stable and reasonable return, independent of
fluctuations in the market. It was when Madoff could
not continue doing this any longer that the plot was
revealed. It was because markets slumped, investors
sought to redeem their investments and new money was
hard to come by, that the operation collapsed, resulting
in bankruptcy and criminal indictment for Madoff and
huge losses for his clients. According to reports,
Madoff’s secret had to be revealed, when the company
was faced in the first week of December with redemption
requests totalling $7 billion from investors.
As the details of Madoff’s operations are being unearthed,
the main question that is being asked is how he managed
so successfully for so long to conceal their nature.
The Madoff story is a mystery for a number of reasons.
To start with, Madoff seems to have defrauded a large
number of investors, dull and savvy, large and small.
In fact, at the time of writing, close to $22 billion
of the $50 billion in assets Madoff claims to have
lost, has still not been traced to investors. Since
Madoff’s fund outperformed the market, the stable
return he promised attracted a wide range of direct
and indirect investors, who appear not to have spent
too much time trying to understand the method that
underlay his success. Investors varied from banks
like Santander, Bank Medici and HSBC, to fund managers
like Fairfield Greenwich and Tremont Capital Management,
to the pension funds of policemen in Fairfield, Connecticut
and teachers in Korea. Indirect exposure was large
because there were a number of Fund managers, who
served as “feeder funds” for Madoff’s operation, mobilising
money from clients and transferring the money to Madoff
for investment.
That investors as diverse as these were all simultaneously
fooled for so long is all the more intriguing because
the investments made by some were huge. There are
five identified investors with exposures of between
$1 and $1.5 billion, another four in the $2.1 billion
and $3.3 billion range, and one, Fairfield Greenwich,
with an exposure of $7.5 billion, which is more than
half of the assets of $14 billion it manages. With
such large investments and high exposure, we should
have at least expected these agents to have scrutinised
Madoff’s operations and accounts closely. That they
did not detect the fraud seems to suggest that the
financial industry is not merely overcome with greed
but is short of intelligence. Stable returns must
be a cause for concern rather than the basis for comfort.
Even aside from the stable and reasonable returns
offered by Madoff, there were other more obvious reasons
to be cautious about investing in his firm. For example,
despite his high profile as a successful broker-turned-investment
manager, Madoff’s operations were audited by a small
entity, Friehing and Horowitz, which reportedly employed
just three people and had not been peer reviewed for
a decade and a half on the grounds that it does not
audit any firm. In addition, Madoff himself was known
to be reserved and guarded about his activities. To
choose to hand over millions or billions of dollars
to an entity of this kind is downright foolish.
But it was not just individual investors who were
foolish. Big banks set up “feeder funds” that mobilised
capital to be invested through Madoff as well as lent
large sums to these funds so as to make leveraged
bets on Madoff. Moreover, leading accounting firms
like PwC, KPMG and Ernst & Young that audited
these feeder funds did not detect the fact that Madoff’s
operations were, in his own words, “one big lie”.
Thos who were fooled included some of the best in
the businesses, who are normally presented as being
too well informed and too savvy to indulge in speculative
investments without knowing that they are doing so.
Not everybody was fooled, of course. Deborah Brewster
of the Financial Times (December 12, 2008) quotes
Thorne Perkin, a Vice President at Papamarkou Asset
Management, as saying: “In the past few years at least
half a dozen smart, sophisticated people have come
to us and asked about investing with Mr Madoff. We
looked into it and didn’t invest mainly because we
could not understand how the returns were arrived
at, and we do not recommend investing where we cannot
work out where the returns come from.” But such advisers
seem to be more the exception than the rule.
This only strengthens the view that financial markets
cannot be left to themselves on the grounds that they
know best and those seeking to regulate these markets
and institutions cannot be equally well informed,
making self-regulation the better alternative. The
Madoff scandal is not only one more confirmation that
the so-called “model” financial markets of the US
are neither transparent nor efficient, but also proof
that so-called savvy investors can either be thieves
or fools. This would not matter so much if their activities
and their effects were confined to a private world
of the rich. But if either directly because of the
exposure of institutions like pension funds and indirectly
because of the systemic effects (transmitted through
excessively exposed banks and corporations) of the
failure of institutions like Madoff Investment Securities,
the ripple effects are economy wide, regulation recommends
itself.
Unfortunately, the Madoff episode is one more indication
of the adverse consequences of diluted regulation.
Christopher Cox, the Chief of the Securities and Exchange
Commission in the US has been quoted as having confessed
that ““over a period of several years, nearly a decade,
credible information was on multiple occasions brought
to the agency, and yet at no point taken to the next
step.” Madoff’s methods, which included maintaining
false documents and disclosing information that was
wrong was not detected but declared by Madoff himself.
This is despite the fact that the SEC reportedly had
launched two investigations, as recently as in 2005
and 2007, into the investment adviser’s operations.
Faced with criticism, the SEC has decided to launch
an internal investigation into how its systems failed
to detect the fraud. The difficulty is that even while
there is recognition now of the need for intervention,
the emphasis is more on intervention to reduce losses
and limit systemic effects. There are no signs of
commitment to fundamentally revamp or overhaul the
regulatory system. While everyone now admits that
the regulatory system has failed and markets do not
work well, the desire to design a regulatory structure
that minimises failure seems absent. This can only
be because financial interests are strong enough to
win a bail-out with tax payers’ money and yet prevent
adequate scrutiny and control.
January
1, 2009.
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